A Crisis of Consistency

There has been a lot of recent talk about to what extent the United States should aid, or abet, the various uprisings in the Middle East. Particularly left leaning commentators, like Jon Stewart and Arsalan Ifitikhar, have criticized President Obama’s handling of the last several months, arguing that his responses to the various international crises have been inconsistent. Middle-East experts have often cited U.S. inconsistency in foreign policy as one of the major reasons for mistrust of the United States and, sparked by Obama’s decision to attack Qaddafi’s forces, once again critics have focused on the irregularities of U.S. involvement worldwide. It seems the United States will champion democracy for others only when it is either politically or economically beneficial for itself.

I think this is probably true; I am sure that incoherent military interventions do not help the U.S. image and are patently unfair to the struggling innocents around the world, especially as we portray ourselves the noble defenders of liberty and democracy. However, commentators bandy around a consistent international approach as if it was a pragmatic solution to the very complex problems the United States faces around the world—it is not.

Take for example the recent U.S. intervention in Libya. Political commentators and international figures have cried foul over Obama’s unpalatable decision to involve the United States in a humanitarian effort in Libya: it is unfair to the oppressed people of Bahrain and Syria and Yemen who also face state sanctioned violence; they rightly claim it is an inconsistent decision. Yet a consistent policy would have the United States in either a dozen other countries or nowhere, and the unfortunate truth is that the United States cannot afford the former. The only consistent option that leaves is doing nothing, and with this in mind, Obama’s decision becomes infallible. Faced with either preventing a deranged dictator from hunting his people through the alleys and streets of Benghazi, or standing back in the name of idealism, there is no choice. Consistency was not an option.

In fact, consistency rarely is. Achieving even theoretical coherency in any policy area, much less one as contentious as foreign affairs, is hard to imagine in the United States. At the longest, a president lasts eight years, after that enters a new politician, and a new agenda. Expecting consistency for longer than that is unrealistic, especially given the recent back-and-forth voting trends that put a new party in power every election. And above all, public opinion is much too inconsistent to ensure a long-term national consensus; just look at the vast drop in support for the Iraq War from 2003 to President Bush’s last year in office.

And even on that rare occasion when long-term consistency can be attained, history suggests the result is neither good for the United States nor anyone else; the Cold War was one such occasion. During the this trying period, the United States, precipitated by the fear of a growing Soviet influence, embarked on a series of interventions that represent perhaps the most consistent foreign policy in our nation’s history; and the result was disastrous. This consistency resulted in the Vietnam and Korean wars; it caused the United States to arm the mujahedeen in Afghanistan and to support dictatorships across Latin America; and it brought the world to the very precipice of nuclear holocaust—this is consistency’s hidden face. Fueled by a prolonged period of self-interest generated by the fear and paranoia brought about as a result of the Cold War, the United States was cornered into consistency only by the threat of terrible violence, only to violently save itself regardless of the cost.

This, however, is not the future that advocates of a consistent foreign policy imagine—they would shudder at the result of true consistency. They are having a problem expressing what they truly wish because their desire for a consistent, international policy actually stems from a desire for a different kind of consistency, one between what the United States does and what she says she will do. In his inaugural address President John F. Kennedy proclaimed to the world that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” And 48 years later President Barack Obama vowed at his inauguration that, “America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.” These critics hear America’s soaring language and seek action to match it; but they are approaching the issue from the wrong side.

It’s not because we are evil, maligned, or unjust that we cannot match our words to our foreign policy, but rather because our words set an impossible standard. It’s not the rest of the world that expects the United States to be the world’s savior; the world expects of us only what we have said we will do. No, the problem is that America is infested by a virus that makes its home in the national ego, perpetuating a feverish quest for global herodom. It has festered for years as politicians stroke our ego, feeding the disease with unrealistic and unhealthy campaign pledges; from this well springs eternal the unobtainable goals that we cannot but help to fall short of. So we should stop talking about pursuing a consistent foreign policy as if it will solve our image problems because ultimately it fills the airwaves with impractical banter that serves no purpose and provides no solutions. Instead, we should come down from our lofty perch, and deal with the world dressed not in an angel’s robes and halo, but a workman’s plaid shirt and jeans.