Syria: Home of a New al-Qaeda?
BY NAHUEL FEFER
Despite the world’s best efforts, The Syrian Civil War is proving difficult to ignore; this March it will enter its third year. Government and rebel forces are at a stalemate, and the civilians are those suffering the most from constant urban, guerilla warfare. Thus far over half a million have fled, and another 2.5 million have been displaced. Confirmed death counts have reached 70,000, but the actual number is likely much higher. The Syrian Civil War’s humanitarian cost, important to highlight though it may be, is obfuscating a more subtle, but important, effect that the war has had: it has resuscitated al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda has been on a downward trajectory since 2006. It has little to do with US counter terrorism activities, and is instead a result of poor public relations and branding. The decline began with what is known as the “Sunni Awakening”. An organic movement, a product of the resentment al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on civilian targets had cultivated in the Iraqi people, resulted in roughly 50,000 civilians spontaneously taking up arms and forming militias in an effort to protect their communities. This powerful event reflected a general disenchantment with al-Qaeda, as a result of its repeated attacks on domestic civilian targets.
The hit al-Qaeda took to its reputation as a result of its unpopular methods in Iraq was compounded by the blow dealt to its relevance by the Arab Spring. The relatively peaceful overthrow of dictators in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrated that there was an alternative to al-Qaeda, that the Arab world could combat Western influence without resorting to radical violence. Even in Libya, where a protracted civil war preceded success, al-Qaeda was rendered irrelevant. The Libyan Civil War made clear that al-Qaeda’s “talent” for violent, destabilizing chaos did not translate well to a more traditional battlefield in which progress was attained via siege, not terror. Even more importantly, it appeared to prove to international observers that al-Qaeda was a weaker, less effective ally than the western nations, which provided aid and set up a no fly zone.
Thus, prior to Syria, al-Qaeda remained a powerful organization but was losing popularity and appearing increasingly irrelevant in the modern world. As a result they seized the opportunity that the Syrian Civil War provided with unsettling cunning, they reinvented the radical Islamist brand. Acknowledging the negative reputation that al-Qaeda developed in Iraq it has named its involvement in Syria: Jabhat al-Nusra. Do not, however, mistake the group for an independent, Syrian group. The group had no history prior to the civil war and is led by “former” members of al-Qaeda who are veterans of the Iraq insurgency.
The name change, however, is not as important as the real changes that al-Nusra has adopted with regards to their approach to war. In an effort to preserve public support and avoid backlash, the al-Nusra front avoids civilian casualties and displays a restraint that was missing from al-Qaeda in Iraq. It does not force Sharia law on those living under its protection – although some civilians have turned to its courts as a source of order in a chaotic environment. Al-Nusra even provides food, gas, and other essentials at below market prices to those who are suffering through a branch of the organization called Qism al-Ighatha, or The Relief Department.
Militarily, the Syrian battlefield plays to their strengths – this war is being fought in the streets. Many cities, most importantly Aleppo and Homs, are divided into rebel and government controlled sections with fluid borders that shift as reinforcements arrive, or buildings are mortared. Furthermore, al-Nusra benefits from the relatively small number of combatants on each side of the conflict – only 100,000 soldiers. Unfortunately for civilians, this turns the war into one of attrition, as neither side appears to have the manpower to shift the current balance in their favor. But it also allows al-Nusra’s relatively small numbers to have a real impact – particularly when magnified by the bombs (on military targets) that are their hallmark.
The largest group, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), may have more than 50,000 members, but al-Nusra’s estimated 5,000 members are unusually well armed as a result of their al-Qaeda support. Experts believe that they possess both heavy artillery and air defense brigades, and have rigorous standards for their members. Most importantly, they are united and organized. They are known as a group than can get things done, and this has made them both popular, and powerful.
Ultimately, only time will tell if al-Nusra and al-Qaeda will be able to turn temporary popularity and military success in Syria into a foothold into the country’s politics, and into convincing evidence of al-Qaeda’s continued relevance to the Arab World. If it does, however, its brand of populist terror may prove more insidious and dangerous than its predecessor.