The Cynical Case for Military Intervention in Syria

BY NAHUEL FEFER

The humanitarian argument for intervention is strong, but often dismissed with the observation that the United States government is not a moral agent and obligated solely to its people. To some extent we all accept this premise, otherwise we would be outraged at the United States spending only .6% of the budget on non-military foreign aid whilst providing trillions for the further development of one of the world’s richest countries. On the other hand, well, we do dispense foreign aid.

Clearly there are times for humanitarian action, but these are usually when the cost to the United States is negligible. Although I believe that the United States should intervene in Syria because it is likely to reduce the suffering of the Syrian people, in the following article I largely ignore the humanitarian argument and present a strategic justification for intervention. In a way, this is an intellectual exercise, but it is an important one, as it ultimately produces a stronger rationale for intervention that pragmatists might find convincing.

Costs of Inaction

Given the complexity of the situation in Syria it can be tempting to conflate caution and wisdom, in this case, however, waiting entails far greater risks than limited action. To understand these risks we must understand what is at stake for the United States in the conflict.

Summary of US interests in Syria:

Ideally the United States desires the formation of a “peaceful, non-sectarian, democratic, legitimate, tolerant” Syrian state, to put it in President Obama’s own words. Unfortunately, lasting, democratic peace is out of reach at the moment – the United States has more attainable goals.

1)     Prevent Bashar al-Assad from consolidating power. Assad’s success would represent a victory for Russian and Iranian influence in the Middle East.

2)     Weaken Jabhat al-Nusra militarily as well as politically. Jabhat al-Nusra is a rebranded al-Qaeda which is, after the Free Syrian Army, the largest Sunni rebel group. It has won major military victories, and is winning the public relations battle within Syria by providing aid and stability to embattled communities. Al-Qaeda is eager to avoid the mistakes of Iraq, hence the rebranding, and hopes to both benefit from the chaos of the civil war, and potentially secure political power should the rebels successfully overthrow Assad.

Aid, sanctions and diplomacy have been the United States’ strategies of choice over the past 3 years. Aid to rebel groups has not significantly changed the dynamic of the conflict, sanctions will likely take years to bear substantial fruit and diplomacy has failed to sway Assad. Ultimately, waiting results in a no-win situation and significant dangers.

Three scenarios, in order of likelihood:

1)     If Assad consolidates power, as is likely if he is allowed to utilize chemical weapons and air strikes without fear of consequences, the United States will lose influence in the Middle East. This influence could prove crucial as Iran progresses towards a nuclear breakout and reaches for Middle Eastern hegemony.

2)     If the stalemate continues on the other hand, Jabhat al-Nusra will be the sole beneficiaries. Al-Nusra thrives on chaos and their influence will continue to increase. As a failed state, Syria could become a breeding ground for terror along the lines of Yemen, Somalia or Afghanistan.

3)     Even if the rebels are somehow able to turn the tide against a professional army backed by an air force and willing to use chemical weapons, the United States will still lose out. Al-Nusra would take some credit for the victory and demand a role in shaping post Assad Syria. This would represent a massive victory for fundamentalist Islam, and partially undo the damage done to it by the Arab Spring.  I realize that the previous sentence is packed, I’ll explain:

• The relatively peaceful overthrow of dictators in Tunisia and Egypt demonstrated that there was an alternative to al-Qaeda, that the Arab world could combat Western influence without resorting to radical violence. Libya and Syria were very different, as violent conflicts, they presented an opportunity for fundamentalist groups to prove their relevance in the fight for progress, as revolts against American enemies, they also presented an opportunity for the United States to be on the side of Arab liberation. In Libya, despite significant Islamist presence, American military support simultaneously strengthened less radical factions that were on good terms with the United States, and fractured extremist groups that the United States was unwilling to support, such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (designated a terrorist organization). While the current Libyan government is far from secular, they have frozen out more radical groups from power. Just as importantly, across the world, credit for the ouster of Qaddafi has gone to the Libyan people and the support provided by western powers – not to terrorists. Victory in Syria achieved without significant western support is extremely unlikely. While preferable to chaos and to a stable Assad regime, rebel victory would produce a very different, and undesirable narrative. It would revitalize fundamentalist Islam, and grant al-Qaeda and affiliated groups renewed relevance as the Arab world strives to move forward.

Ultimately inaction has produced two dangerous, if thankfully conflicting, trends. It has emboldened Assad, increasing the likelihood of his success. Once again this would represent a long term strategic victory for Russia and Iran. Second, waiting has allowed Jabhat al-Nusra to grow. The Syrian people are, as a whole, less radical than their Libyan counterparts, and were initially unreceptive to al-Nusra. Desperation has forced them to rely on the increasingly popular group. In fact, bolstered by Saudi support, Jabhat al-Nusra, while smaller than the Free Syrian Army, is also better provisioned, trained, and most importantly, armed.

The Promise of Military Intervention

Military action is often framed in terms of risk, but we should be looking at it as an opportunity. As the situation stands in Syria, the United States can only lose. We can use military action, however to shape the situation to our advantage. In Libya, military support implicitly contingent on pro-western leadership helped dissolve radical elements of the rebel movement.

In Syria, the United States has already recognized the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. The government in exile is closely linked with the Free Syrian Army, has no ties to al-Nusra and few, if any radical members. Aside from saving lives and helping turn the tide against Assad, military support for the National Coalition/FSA would strengthen them politically and simultaneously call al-Nusra’s future in Syria into question, thus reducing their popularity.

It is important to note that the above analysis is predicated on an assumption that military intervention will be effective. There are a couple of reasons for optimism. Syrian air defense, while more formidable than that of Libya is aging. In fact, throughout the civil war Israeli planes have attacked Syrian military targets three times with no losses. Defensive infrastructure is also mainly focused on defending an attack from Israel and the Mediterranean. Attacks from bases in Turkey, who has pledged support for strikes, would encounter fairly light opposition.

The more pressing problem is the extent to which the Syrian conflict lends itself to aerial support (boots on the ground are not being considered), after all, most of the fighting is confined to cities. Setting up a no fly zone and targeting stationary military targets, however, would nullify two of Assad’s greatest advantages: his air force, which he has used to bomb rebel held neighborhoods, and his superior military infrastructure (including access to chemical weapons). Given our military capacity and Syria’s weak defenses, these objectives seem within reach.

Conclusion

Syria is a country of over 20 million people, “only” 100 to 200 thousand of which are active rebels. The war seems unwinnable and most people do their best to remain safe. US military support could change everything. Aside from removing Assad’s air force and much of his military infrastructure, it would spur defections, improve civilian safety and morale, and boost the ranks of the Free Syrian Army whose power would come to dwarf that of al-Nusra. Assad would soon be ousted and the National Council would take power. There, however, it gets murky, and the real challenge begins. But that is a topic for a different article. First, we must take action.