Don’t Forget About Colombia

Much of the world’s attention this summer has been focused on the negotiations between the P5+1 countries and Iran regarding the latter state’s nuclear capabilities. At the same time, however, an equally important series of negotiations has been taking place in Colombia that has the potential to transform that country. The battle between the Colombian government and the left-wing guerilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC) has raged at various levels of intensity for over half a century. Now, however, the negotiation of a solution to the conflict has entered its final stage – but whether such a solution can be effectively worked out depends on a host of complex factors.

For those unfamiliar with the conflict, a brief explanation of its background and the negotiations underway to end the hostilities is in order. In the 1960s, the Colombian government, aided by CIA operatives, launched a crackdown on rural communist guerilla groups that were fighting for greater peasant control over land. In 1964, several of these groups reorganized themselves into the FARC. Conflict between the guerillas and the government increased dramatically during the 1980s as the illegal drug trade in Colombia skyrocketed. Since 1964, over 200,000 people have been killed as a result of the fighting between Colombian government forces and the insurgents.

In 2010, former defense minister Juan Manuel Santos was elected president of Colombia. In August 2012, Santos announced the beginning of talks between the FARC and the government to negotiate an end to the conflict. However, these negotiations have now dragged on for three years and have been interspersed with several major incidents of violence between the two sides. For example, in April of this year FARC rebels murdered 11 government soldiers in a midnight attack. In response, the Colombian government killed 26 FARC members in a raid, which in turn caused the FARC to attack critical infrastructure such as oil pipelines. This latest spate of violence has increased the Colombian population’s distrust of the peace process. In April of this year, a Gallup poll revealed that only 52 percent of Colombians are “optimistic” that the current negotiations will produce a lasting deal, down from 69 percent just two months earlier.

Along with these outbreaks of violence, the underlying motivations of both sides at the negotiating table are also potential stumbling blocks on the path to reconciliation. For example, the FARC, which is labeled by the Colombian government as a terrorist organization, sees itself as a legitimate political movement that represents the oppressed workers of rural Colombia. The Santos administration has diffused some of this tension by guaranteeing the FARC some form of political representation in a post conflict government. However, a major sticking point regarding the future of the FARC is how the leaders of the organization should be punished. According to Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue, FARC commanders argue that they should not be charged for rebelling against the state because they are the “victims of a repressive government,” whereas 80 percent of Colombians believe that the leaders of the FARC deserve incarceration. This disagreement must be overcome for negotiations to be successful.

On the government’s side, President Santos currently has an approval rating of only 29 percent, stemming from the discontent of many Colombians over the most recent violent exchanges between the government and the FARC. Some critics have argued that Santos, by declaring a December deadline for the final agreement, is trying to force through a mediocre deal in order to secure his political legacy. Others have argued that his weakened popular support has left him no other option but to agree to whatever deal is negotiated, and that he will resort to renewed campaigns against the FARC if they fail to uphold their end of the bargain. Both possibilities could hinder the negotiation of an effective peace plan.

Despite the disparate goals of the two factions, several important agreements have already been made in the negotiation process. These include new initiatives such as economic stimulus for rural areas devastated by years of fighting as well as an end to the government’s policy of spraying pesticides on fields of coca, which is used to produce cocaine (the FARC’s main revenue source). Further pragmatic decisions on the part of both parties, such as the FARC signing a legally binding ceasefire in exchange for judicial leniency for lower ranking members, could add the final grease to the wheels of the peace process and produce an effective agreement to bring the decades of violence to an end. Instead of sticking to stubborn demands and rushed negotiating tactics, the two sides should use the next four months to continue to compromise and to come to a final consensus that successfully ensures the future security of their country.