South Korea’s Got Beef With America

It’s summer 2008. Tens of thousands of South Korean citizens pour into the streets of Seoul, holding demonstrations and organizing marches day and night. An overtaxed Seoul police force uses water cannons in sporadic clashes with protesters. President Lee Myungbak sees his approval ratings plummet to below 20% as his cabinet begins to tender resignation letters. US diplomats hurriedly meet with their South Korean counterparts, and statements are floated before the media that the turmoil will not affect the US-ROK security alliance.

The issue driving all this instability?

Beef.

Delicious, affordable American beef.

See, in 2003 it was detected that bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or “mad cow disease”, was present in some American cattle. South Korea was one of many countries that banned imports of American beef in response. This ban lasted for almost four years until President Lee entered negotiations with the Bush administration in January 2008 and reversed the ban. Although unknown at the time, this was one of the first steps towards the ultimate ratification of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement in 2011. This beef ban reversal eventually precipitated mass protests in Seoul as demonstrators accused President Lee of bowing to American bullying, at the cost of Korean public health.

The 2008 U.S. Beef Protest eventually died down with no major consequences for Lee’s administration. American beef resumed its flow. In December 2016 it was reported that American beef exports to South Korea reached the $1 billion mark. By itself, American beef might not have put the alliance in jeopardy, but it is a key example of the numerous issues which plague the U.S.-South Korean relationship. Even with the United States tied to South Korea by a long history of cooperation and shared security concerns, fissures continue to appear in bilateral relations. If those fissures are allowed to fester, there will be far more than ribeye at stake.

[pullquote]By itself, American beef might not have put the alliance in jeopardy, but it is a key example of the numerous issues which lay in the path of a strong US-South Korean relationship.[/pullquote]

President Trump’s summit with President Moon Jae-In last June was not a wholly new cut on American relations with South Korea. In line with Trump’s anti-globalization rhetoric, he has accused South Korean companies of grazing on unfair trade deals. Most of Trump’s beefier complaints have quieted as Moon Jae-In has followed the U.S. lead in dealings with North Korea, but there is no doubt that American vacillations have startled the herd. But for many South Koreans, the new American administration is merely an extension of an existing narrative of American dominance of South Korean affairs. Regardless of the accusation that the Bush administration bullied Lee Myung-bak into allowing American beef is true, what’s important is that the public widely perceived it to be the case.

[pullquote]Regardless of the accusation that the Bush administration bullied Lee Myung-bak into allowing American beef is true, what’s important is that the public widely perceived it to be true.[/pullquote]

This administration’s extraction of promises to renegotiate the U.S.-R.O.K. Free Trade Agreement and address the U.S. goods trade deficits is particularly ill-timed, as South Korea is still reeling from crippling Chinese sanctions that were issued after the initial deployment of THAAD systems and South Korean lawmakers have very real concerns that their alliance might lead to Seoul being nuked. That South Korea might have to punish its own business in a renegotiation of the FTA is only one more source of pressure that threatens to push South Korea out of America’s orbit.

China, too, has enough leverage to drive a wedge into the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance. Even though China’s sanctions failed to force Moon’s administration to reverse the deployment of THAAD, the effects were udderly devastating. South Korea’s trade ties with China is the tenderloin of its economy and Moon Jae-In faces plenty of domestic pressure to avoid spoiling the milk. He has since reassured Beijing that there are limits to South Korea’s alliance with the United States. In an interview on November 4th, President Moon ruled out the possibility of a trilateral alliance with the U.S. and Japan, pushing against broader American strategic dreams of a unified Northeast Asian bloc to balance China’s influence. This is combined with recent proposals for a domestic nuclear policy and an accelerated ballistic missile program by South Korean lawmakers. Given the unreliability of Trump’s commitment to American agreements abroad, fears of a nuclear North Korea, and trade ties with China amid U.S. cries of economic unfairness, there are real incentives for South Korea will become more independent of its constraining bilateral ties with the United States.

To be clear, it is still very likely that Moon Jae-In will continue to pursue a pragmatic policy of continued cooperation with the Trump-led United States. The 30,000 American troops stationed in Korea will not disappear overnight. But a re-calibration on how the United States manages its presence in the country is needed to reassure lawmakers in Seoul and the South Korean public that the U.S. is a reliable and helpful ally. Otherwise, the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance which has lasted for the past sixty years may become seared in ways that won’t be easily repaired.

Syrus Jin ‘19 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at jin.s@wustl.edu.