World Order and American Interest
International order, narrowly defined, means “the body of rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations among key players in the international environment.” Such rules, norms, and institutions include trade deals, security norms, networks, and alliances. The current international order arose after World War II and was shaped subsequently by the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. It assumes American leadership and commitment and promotes American interests and values. It is also a central theme to the U.S. security strategy for decades, as the U.S. kept investing in it for long-term peace and prosperity.
Yet the volume of U.S. commitment that the current international order demands is not sustainable. As the global economy slows down, the U.S. government has to confront the issue of resource scarcity. Mackenzie Eaglen, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has pointed out in her report to the Senate that U.S. defense strategy needs to spend wisely with limited budget. President Trump also articulated his concern over disproportional U.S. commitment by calling on allies to share responsibilities. Beyond budget constraint, globalization has been associated with inequality and unemployment for American workers, making it harder for the U.S. to extend its economic influence through free trade agreements. Given the inevitable contraction of U.S. power, the U.S. has to make trade-offs and identify priorities in the order-maintenance job, or the job could drain U.S. economy and hurt the image of the U.S. government.
[pullquote]Given the inevitable contraction of U.S. power, the U.S. has to make trade-offs and identify priorities in the order-maintenance job.[/pullquote]
In his new book Preventive Engagement, Paul B. Stares, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, proposed a risk-management framework for assessing trade-offs and determining priorities. He visited Wash U on Jan 25th and 26th to talk about his suggestions for the U.S. security strategy.
Stares argued that the current security strategy is a supply-side strategy, where the only options are “Do More” and “Do Less”. “Do More” means more engagement in all aspects, from strengthening alliances to engaging in nation building. “Do Less”, on the contrary, means withdrawal in all aspects, from economic isolation to selective intervention. “Do More” versus “Do Less” poses a dilemma for the U.S. security strategy which, under this premise, is asked to weigh domestic interest against oversea interest. Stares suggests that the dilemma is caused by poor designs in the current strategy. With an alternative approach, the U.S. can maximize its leverage with limited resources and stay powerful in the international arena.
[pullquote]With an alternative strategy, the U.S. can maximize its leverage with limited resources and stay powerful on the international arena.[/pullquote]
The approach Stares proposes is the called “demand-side strategy,” a risk-management framework that emphasizes forward-thinking and forward-engagement in foreign policy. The demand-side strategy is constituted by three parts: the long-term, the medium-term, and the short-term. In the long-term, the U.S. should: maintain strategic stability with other major powers such as Russia, China, and India; strengthen international institutions and bolster their functions; maintain alliances and encourage responsibility-sharing; promote international trade; and foster global development. In the medium-term, the U.S. intelligence agencies should make plans and rank priorities 12 to 18 months ahead. They should intervene immediately before any risk evolves into crisis. Through early engagement, American agents can change the interest calculation of dangerous political actors or deprive them of violent means, therefore lowering the probability of a full-scale crisis. In the short-term, when a crisis has already broken out, the U.S. should pursue de-escalation with all possible means. The central theme of Stares’ strategy is to act earlier with more precision. To plan for the next year or the next five years, the intelligence community needs more comprehensive knowledge to extrapolate potential outcomes. A side benefit of Stares’s strategy is the proposal of a risk-centered resource allocation scheme, which solves the “Do More” versus “Do Less” dilemma in supply-side strategy and operationalizes the ideal of wise spending.
[pullquote]The U.S. cannot be both a guarantor of the order and a player in the system without any conflict in interest.[/pullquote]
The alternative strategy Stares proposed entails changes in security-related agencies. More bureaucrats need to devote their time to studying mid-term and long-term strategies and more elected officials need to create incentives for them to do so. Furthermore, the alternative strategy differentiates U.S. interests from its obligation towards the liberal, democratic international order. America did invest a lot in the current order, but such investments were justified because they favored America. The U.S. cannot be both a guarantor of the order and a player in the system without any conflict of interest, unless the system internalizes American interests, or some responsibility-sharing mechanisms are introduced. As pure players, Russia and China have used both institutional politics and power politics on the international arena, sometimes challenging the system and sometimes taking advantage of it. President Trump, on withdrawing from the Paris Accords and the TPP, seems envious of the players’ privilege. His moves captured the domestic anxiety towards foreign policy, but such anxiety needs to be properly channeled through calculated choices, not straight-up withdrawal or reluctant intervention. Demand-side strategy, by justifying expenses with risks and lowering costs with early action, would hopefully address this anxiety as a genuine solution.
Yumeng Zou ‘20 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences and is a staff writer for WUPR. She can be reached at yumeng.zou@wustl.edu.