What’s Next?
One of my friends recently spoke to me about a family vacation to Russia. It happened a few years ago, or in her words, “before everything got weird.” She hit on something strange that is happening all around us. We are eighteen years into the 21st century, and there is a feeling that something undefinable has changed. The world feels different now than it did just a few short years ago. Populists rise in Western democracies, the ghosts of Cold War conflicts haunt Washington and Moscow, and Chinese and American warships ply the South China sea, eying each other suspiciously. Technology companies are seeing billions of dollars evaporate in a growing panic about the harvesting of personal data. China builds a security state that would give Orwell nightmares, all while exporting valuable infrastructure projects across the world. The U.S. rejects immigration while staying on track to have the highest foreign-born population in the nation’s history inside of a decade. There are always changes, but the historical moment right now feels pregnant with possibilities, a fundamental shift towards a new reality that will define the rest of the 21st century. This future will be a strange combination of old and new. The United States and China will remain the world’s pre-eminent powers, but the nature of their competition will benefit regional hegemons. Economies and political institutions will see accelerated growth, but the risk of failed states and violent conflicts will rise.
[pullquote]The historical moment right now feels pregnant with possibilities, a fundamental shift towards a new reality that will define the rest of the 21st century.[/pullquote]
Comparisons to the early 20th century miss much that has changed since 1914, but there is an undeniably similar current in modern international politics. Like then, there are increasing numbers of regional powers jostling for position. However, this fluid international system is developing in the midst of an accelerating power struggle between the United States and China. Both nations are well positioned to be dominant powers for the rest of the 21st century. They have strong economies and large populations, which allows their governments the freedom to allocate substantial funds on military kit and diplomatic missions. The United States is still an immigration magnet, with an estimated population of 404 million in 2060. That would still only be a third of China’s estimated 1.2 billion but would be almost solely a result of immigration rather than natural population growth. Both China and the United States see themselves as natural leaders, and as Xi Jinping solidifies his one-man, one-party rule, the two have increasingly divergent systems of government, society, and economics. This has already resulted in escalating tensions and low-scale confrontation, from military competition in the South China Sea to the Trump Administration’s denial of a U.S. computer-chip maker by a Singaporean company on national-security grounds.
[pullquote]A new international system is being developed in the midst of an accelerating power struggle between the United States and China.[/pullquote]
Despite the fears of a looming trade war, both nations’ economies remain deeply intertwined, and neither country would benefit from armed conflict. How politicians in Washington and Beijing manage this uneasy relationship will dominate international relations for the foreseeable future. Both will court allies across the globe to buttress their position, enhancing the influence of a variety of regional powers such as the European Union, India, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa. Even if none of these entities aspire for or attain international prominence, their regional dominance will grant them a great deal of power. This is especially true in Africa, as the story of the next fifty years will increasingly be a story of African prosperity or poverty, democracy or dictatorship.
Most future population growth will come from Africa, with outcomes that will range from economic boom to stagnation and civil war. By 2050 Nigeria will vie with the United States as the world’s third-most-populous country, with over 300 million people. Djibouti is home to the first overseas Chinese base, and is already home to bases for Japan, the United States, the European Union, and others. Thirty nations of the African Union have already agreed to the African Continental Free Trade Area, which creates a single market that could one day cover all of Africa, increasing intra-African trade by over 50%. As infrastructure expands throughout the continent, markets will boom. But the skyrocketing wealth of the region could also lead to corruption, massive inequality, and the undermining of fragile governments, causing civil war and worse. The Democratic Republic of Congo is a good example of the promise and pitfalls that will fill the headlines for the next decades.
The DRC is especially pregnant with great promise but huge pitfalls. The country is hugely rich in the rare earth elements that will be increasingly important with the rise of electric cars and ever-more-powerful computing. Its population is booming, with Kinshasa on track to have more than six million inhabitants by 2025. But it is chaotic and undemocratic, poorly positioned to manage its growing population and economy. If it were to become a failed state in a future of ubiquitous batteries and electric cars, the international repercussions and human cost would likely be massive. Such a conflict would risk becoming a proxy war as states vied for control of valuable resources, with the population of Congo caught in the middle. It could combine the lawlessness of Somalia, the death toll of previous wars in Congo, and a lust for resources that would match anything seen in the Middle East.
Conflicts and opportunities across the continent could be accelerated amidst Chinese-American competition. Somalia, a failed state for over twenty years, has already effectively ceased to exist. New nations could become important overnight as each side searches for allies. For example, the de facto independent region of Somaliland, with a relatively well-functioning democratic government, could become a magnet for American money and military assistance. It is conceivable that a stable Somaliland might one day be home to the U.S. 6th Fleet, given the uncomfortable relationship the U.S. has with authoritarian Bahrain. Likewise, as China becomes confident in its position as a global powerhouse, it might help similarly-minded authoritarian regimes stamp out terrorist organizations and domestic dissent. Perhaps under a new president an authoritarian regime such as Zimbabwe could enhance its legitimacy by using Chinese loans to build up its economy, in return for which China would gain economic access and closer political ties. Authoritarian-minded technocratic leaders, such as Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, will find similarities with China, and economic integration would benefit both nations and allow each to extol the virtues of their preferred system over liberal capitalism.
It is as yet too early to see whether most Asian and African nations will adopt a Chinese or American model. China is attempting to exercise influence through its Belt and Road initiative, a generous program of infrastructure investments. Railways in Kenya, roads in Pakistan, a massive “land port” in Kazakhstan: by re-centering trade around China, Beijing hopes to build the foundation for a new political reality. However, even as Kenya took a huge Chinese loan to build a new railway, its Supreme Court demonstrated an independence and authority in the 2017 elections that moved the nation closer to the political norms of the West.
[pullquote]It is as yet too early to see whether most Asian and African nations will adopt a Chinese or American model.[/pullquote]
In Asia, there is a similar economic and political ambiguity. China is asserting itself in the South China Sea and courting longtime American allies such as the Philippines, with aims to build a blue water navy that can go toe-to-toe with the United States. This is provoking a backlash. Even after the United States withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the other signatories re-negotiated and signed the deal, signaling their independence from China. While still a great strategic loss for the U.S., this was an assertion of sovereignty for the Asian nations involved. It is possible that most of these nations will continue to play both nations off each other without committing to a definite camp. This would further increase the relative power of regional hegemons, although it would also increase the risk of failed states, as intense competition would accelerate local conflicts.
Political and economic competition will increasingly come to bear on new industries. Computing will become increasingly integrated into our lives, but the questions that plague the West about privacy and monopolies are not a concern in China. Indeed, the nation is building a surveillance system that uses facial recognition technology with the goal of recording where everyone is at all times. The country is also in the early stages of rolling out a social credit system that determines eligibility for international travel and city living, in which citizens receive perks for informing on their neighbors. This 21st-century update to totalitarianism could one day be packaged wholesale and sold to Chinese-friendly regimes in Asia and Africa that struggle with instability. Indeed, relatively democratic nations in unstable parts of the world might buy into this surveillance state “franchise” as a way to address terrorist threats. This will occur alongside more traditional technological change, as companies such as Amazon and Alibaba will compete in new markets, and against homegrown champions. Economics and politics will most likely become more closely integrated, as economic decisions will be viewed through a political lens. Whether a country takes a Chinese or an American loan, for example, might be seen as an indicator of its political allegiance.
We seem to be on the verge of a new world, with new geopolitical trends and new international flashpoints. Given that the emerging contours of America–China competition are less restrictive than during the Cold War, regional powers will gain increasing importance as they play both sides or come down firmly in a particular camp. This will likely accelerate economic growth and political development, especially in Africa. However, there will be increasing risks to failure, with potentially disastrous consequences.
Christopher Hall ‘18 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at c.a.hall@wustl.edu.