Islamophobia In China

Islamophobia has long been frowned upon in Western societies, as many deem this an act of religious discrimination or xenophobia; this is not, however, the case in China. In recent years, posting anti-Islam speeches on China’s social media almost became a politically correct thing: people would speak of Muslims in the way Westerners talk about racists and homophobes, many even call for forced apostasy and genocide. This should not be simply seen as another example where citizens of the “Central Kingdom” reject foreign culture. Rather, this is more likely a combined effort from religious, ethnic, and political divides that affect the public opinions of the Chinese people.

The most obvious trigger for China’s Islamophobia lies in its religious divergences. Since the dawn of China’s civilization, the Chinese people have never been swayed by a dominating religion. Granted, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, ancestral worship, and local cults have been influential to certain regions at certain times, but all of them are dwarfed in comparison to the height of Christianity in the West or Islam in the Middle East. This incompatibility deepens as the communist regime pushes for Marx’s materialism, thereby enlarging the population of atheists or agnostics. Among the secular population, many deem wearing a hijab or praying five times a day unenlightened at best and therefore not something fitting for modern China.

[su_pullquote]The Islam problem in China is an ethnic one: almost all of the Muslim population come from China’s ethnic minority, whereas the Han ethnicity, which makes up about 92 percent of China’s population, is mostly nonreligious.[/su_pullquote]It should also be noted that the Islam problem in China is an ethnic one: almost all of the Muslim population come from China’s ethnic minority, whereas the Han ethnicity, which makes up about 92 percent of China’s population, is mostly nonreligious. The Chinese government’s ethnic policies also failed to improve the situation, as it grants enormous privileges to the ethnic minority. For example, the widely criticized “One Child Policy” doesn’t apply to the ethnic minority, which is a great deal when considering China’s traditional emphasis on having big families. Another outrageous policy is called “两(liang)少(shao)一(yi)宽(kuan)”, which is a governmental guideline that grants the ethnic minority less sentencing or punishment in the eyes of law. Basically, for the same crime, a 20 years sentence for an ethnic minority could easily change into a death penalty for a Han ethnicity. Not only is this policy a severe violation of isonomy and equality of law, it is also widely criticized in the public as this policy is applied to some of the most serious crimes, such as murder, rape, and fornication with underage girls. These unfair privileges enjoyed by the ethnic minority have made many Hans disgruntled, and they tend to release this hate toward the most visible minority group—the Muslims (seeing that the ethnic minorities in China don’t have drastically different skin colors).

[su_pullquote align=”right”]Chinese people look down upon those who demand privileges, just because they consider themselves victims of being the minority.[/su_pullquote]Muslim privileges also cause major public aversion. In this case, most controversy comes from the matter of halal food. 民(min)宗(zong)委(wei), the department in charge of religion and ethnic matters, once issued a policy in 2002 demanding that institutions of higher education establish a separate dining hall for halal food, many of which only serve Muslim students (imagine if the DUC only served halal food, and non-Muslim students were not allowed to enter). In the case of Ocean University of China, a group of local Muslims smashed the school’s halal dining hall for serving non-Muslims. To make the matter worse, the China Islamic Association once rallied Muslims all over the country to raid or demolish restaurants serving non-halal food in the vicinity of Muslim neighborhoods. These regulations and actions are discriminatory by their own nature. Furthermore, they contradict China’s traditional values, as Chinese people look down upon those who demand privileges, just because they consider themselves victims of being the minority.

[su_pullquote]Organizations like the East Turkistan Organization are real, substantive threats to the people of China, unlike how Western media tend to depict them as “freedom fighters” against the regime.[/su_pullquote]Domestically inspired terrorism further expands the rift between Chinese people and the Muslims. Organizations like the East Turkistan Organization are real, substantive threats to the people of China, unlike how Western media tend to depict them as “freedom fighters” against the regime. These terrorist attacks are in sharp contrast with China’s exceptional public safety, pushing many to believe that Muslims are the only ones keeping China from having a total and long-lasting peaceful society. Moreover, the people responsible for such terrorism aren’t foreign radical religious zealots from the Middle East—they tend to be your everyday neighbor, who got tricked or controlled or simply convinced by the more inflammatory branches of Islam into committing such horrendous acts. Therefore, in the eyes of Chinese people, the domestic Muslims are like sleeper cells, readily waiting to be triggered into becoming coldhearted terrorists.

Certainly, this is not an argument condoning the trend of Islamophobia in China. Yet these social phenomena should serve as a warning sign for China’s religion and ethnic policy: were this conflict to be left unaddressed by the Chinese government, the situation as of now would become a ticking bomb, waiting for something or someone to let it blow.

Yiran Cheng studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at yirancheng@wustl.edu.