The Iraqi Impasse
Unbeknownst to you, dear reader, quarantined in the shelter of your home, is that about seven thousand miles away, in Iraq, there exist a throng of apoplectic protesters refusing to return to the sanctuary of their homes because they have yet to triumph in a battle; a battle against systemic corruption, sectarian auspices, and political bartering. A battle they do not intend to lose.
Fatigued by the clandestine operations of foreign powers and furious with the corrupt web of patronage within their government, Iraqis took to the streets in October 2019 to voice their indignation. What began as a cry for better services and a termination of corruption morphed into a sweeping rejection of the system. As protesters continue to congregate despite the COVID-19 curfews, it remains unlikely that their demands will be met.
THE BACKSTORY
In September 2019, Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, with his lips zipped stubbornly shut, demoted the Iraqi citizen’s beloved commander of elite counterterrorism forces to the Department of Ministry. The controversial decision ignited allegations of purging a coalition that threatened Iranian-backed politicians. As social media platforms erupted with criticism, the popular uprising quickly ballooned into a major threat to Iraqi leadership, rattling the political elite.
The government’s violent response towards civilians has induced a moral uproar. Rebels are already vexed by the siphoning off of oil revenues to the upper echelons of society, leaving little for education, job creation, and infrastructure. PM Mahdi resigned on November 29, 2019, but the ensuing ethno-sectarian division between the parliamentary blocs has paralyzed the legislature.
A TRIP BACKSTAGE
While Iraq has been maturing as a democracy, the political dynamism of the system functions much like a nondemocracy. As in nondemocratic regimes, corruption becomes a feature of the market, a means to appease the leader’s allies to maintain his own power. Other than corruption, the ruler resorts to taxation, foreign aid, or revenues from natural resources (in Iraq’s case, oil). This philosophy is one of the many in Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s The Dictator’s Handbook. In a nutshell, their Machiavellian analysis of political systems is that good policy need not mean good politics.
Iraq’s leaders have kept the elite satisfied by taking from the Iraqi people, but this corruption has become so rampant that it has pushed the population beyond its tipping point. The uprising has been fueled by the prospect that civilians have so little to lose that they are undeterred by the possibility of punishment. Perpetrator research can provide the rationale behind how a country’s own security forces can turn their backs on their own citizens—in light of the stunning momentum of the recent uprisings, courts have labeled violent suppression as “acts of counterterrorism” to justify the killing and maiming of rebels. Popular uprisings, however, remain unsuccessful without the support of some kind of elite or foreign power, which the Iraqi citizens do not have.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
Mahdi is currently back in office as a “volunteer absentee” managing governmental affairs until a new government is formed. With the current coronavirus pandemic coupled with a sharp decline in oil prices threatening to increase the country’s budget deficits, and Mahdi’s de facto continuation of power bringing the Iraqi protests to an all-time high, Iraq currently teeters at a critical political precipice. Demonstrators in Tahrir square declared that they will accept any leader except Mahdi and allow for enough time for the new candidate to implement their manifesto of systemic changes.
COME BACK HOME, AMERICA?
Ever since the rise of the Islamic State (or ISIS), U.S. troops have utilized the Arab state as a tool to promulgate its anti-Iran sentiments, reflective in confrontational Trumpian foreign policy. In light of the recent protests, U.S. embassies in Iraq have faced attacks from Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the assassination of Qasem Soleimani has only amplified anti-American sentiments.
While the United States should not remain in Iraq long-term, sudden withdrawal is not the answer either. The U.S. should take the opportunity to profit off of continued engagement and adopt a more diplomatic policy towards Iraq by helping to stabilize the unconsolidated democracy through investment, trade and scientific exchange. If history, like the Marshall Plan 70 years ago, has taught us anything, it is that sidelining the need for primacy and focusing on rebuilding the fractured political system will serve as a much better use of U.S. power in the long run.
CONCLUSION
While the outside world is battling a panic of an unknown degree, the Iraqi people are battling a world of panic inside themselves. Think back to the wounded rebel, the threatened politician, or the homesick U.S. soldier.
Feels pretty good to be the reader, doesn’t it?