How Extremists Can Threaten, and Moderates Can Save, the Two-State Solution
During the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, Israel and Fatah both accepted the two-state solution as the basis for a peace settlement between the two nations. But Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) prevented both parties from implementing the two-state solution by launching a campaign of terrorism that incited violence between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel and Fatah have continued to endorse the two-state solution, but by playing into the strategies of Palestinian extremist groups, they have failed to bring about a viable peace settlement. For Israel and Fatah to implement a viable peace settlement, both must act with restraint and avoid antagonizing each other into renewing hostilities.
With the Oslo Accords, Israel and Fatah took productive steps toward a two-state solution. Israel agreed to limit its military operations and entrusted Fatah with enforcing the peace in much of the West Bank and Gaza through the newly established Palestinian Authority. But as Israel and Fatah took the first steps toward a lasting peace settlement, Palestinian extremists attempted to derail the peace process.
Hamas and PIJ engaged in terrorism to weaken support for moderate agreements in Israel and Palestine. By escalating violence against Israel, Hamas and PIJ used two of what Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter describe as the “principal strategic logics” of terrorism: “spoiling” and “outbidding.”
The terrorist campaigns “spoiled” the peace process by provoking Israel into taking military action. As terrorist attacks increased, the Israeli government doubted whether Fatah was capable or even willing to enforce peace in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel responded by conducting military operations against Hamas and PIJ within both areas, leading to massive destruction and civilian casualties that angered the Palestinian public.
Moreover, Israel did not respond to these individual acts of terrorism with immediate retaliation, but instead conducted military operations against Hamas and PIJ when opportunities presented themselves—whether in times of relative calm or open violence. This “mowing the grass” strategy generally benefited Israel in the short term by forcing Hamas and PIJ to reconsolidate their forces. However, it had negative long-term consequences for Israeli security. These operations might have appeared justified to Israeli leadership—uniquely privy to intelligence on planned terrorist attacks—but their opportunistic strikes often appeared to the Palestinian public to be unprovoked attacks. Palestinians began to rally against peace talks with Israel and pressured Fatah to retaliate.
The Palestinian public’s shift against cooperation with Israel allowed Hamas and PIJ to “outbid” their more moderate rivals in Fatah and to present themselves as the true protectors of Palestinian rights.
As the Palestinian people demanded immediate action against Israel, Fatah, whether it wanted to or not, felt compelled to engage in violence against Israel to retain public support. Before the resurgence in violence, Fatah held popular recognition as the leading advocate for the Palestinian cause. This reputation allowed them to win public support for their more moderate policies, including the Oslo Accords with Israel. But as the Palestinian people were now demanding retaliation against Israel, Fatah faced competition for its base of support. If Fatah continued with peace talks, Hamas and PIJ might have replaced the party as the leaders of the Palestinian independence movement. If Fatah instead chose to engage in violence, it might have been more capable of retaining public support. Faced with the two options, the leaders of Fatah chose to abandon peace talks and launch their own campaign of violence against Israel.
Israel and Fatah have failed to agree to a viable peace accord not due to the actions of Hamas and PIJ alone, but because of their own confrontational responses to extremist efforts to derail the peace process. Israeli military operations in the region continue to alienate Palestinians, and Israel’s recent plans to annex parts of the West Bank have only further fueled Palestinian resentment towards the peace process. Fatah has responded by suspending cooperation with Israel on vital matters of security as well as economic and social development.
Israel and Fatah should recognize that their confrontational reactions to the terrorist campaigns of Hamas and PIJ have prevented them from implementing a viable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel should not rely excessively on military operations in Palestine but should instead adopt a more restrained approach that relies on increasing security precautions within Israel such as improving their anti-missile defenses. This reduction in invasive military operations in the West Bank and Gaza would allow Fatah to retain popular support within Palestine while simultaneously maintaining their more moderate stance. If implemented with genuine effort on both sides, such a course would bring the conflict to a more peaceful resolution.