What has likely been a years-long covert affair has recently turned public, as Israel and several Gulf states have announced a normalization of relations in recent months. In an effort to counter the ever-growing Iranian influence in the region, the nations have agreed to put aside their difference regarding the Israeli Palestinian conflict—much to the chagrin of the Palestinians—in an embodiment of the phrase “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” While the peace accords began with smaller nations, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, larger countries who have been even more critical of Israel in the past—such as Sudan—have recently followed suit. 

All of these shifts in the region raise pressing questions for the ultimate power broker of the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia. Considering the Saudis’ close ties and relative control over the UAE and Bahrain, it is unlikely that those deals were negotiated without their approval. And, while the current king remains a staunch opponent of Israel, Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman is positioned to take power any day now. He has expressed serious interest in normalizing relations with Israel, even meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in person. This is emblematic of a younger generation of Arabs who, due to their lack of first-hand experience during the Arab-Israeli wars of the 20th century, are much more open to receiving the vast benefits that a normalization of relations with Israel could incur. These potential assets most notably include a significant increase in military aid from the United States and the ability to take part in Israel’s high tech economy. 

While the Saudis have enjoyed the Trump administration’s beneficial treatment over the past four years, which has largely stemmed from President Trump’s hardline stance on Iran, a new administration is poised to take office. A Biden administration is highly unlikely to give the same deference to the Saudis that they received from his predecessor, yet the foreseeable normalization of relations with Israel could complicate the matter significantly. Therein lies President-Elect Biden’s dilemma. 

Considering his desire to renegotiate and reenter the JCPOA, Biden’s strategy with Iran seems to be substantially less confrontational and thus would not necessitate an unusually close relationship with their main adversary—the Saudis. Moreover, the continued human rights abuses by the royal family, epitomized by the dismemberment of journalist Jamaal Khashoggi, make the left-leaning Biden administration even more wary of direct support. That being said, the undeniable strategic advantage that could come from an American-Israeli-Saudi alliance would likely be a fatal blow to Iran’s quest to extend their power throughout the Arab world. Considering the inroads that Iran has already made in Qatar, a Gulf nation, the threat to regional stability is no longer abstract. Therefore, the question becomes: where should the Biden administration draw the line between this unique tactical opportunity and a genuine commitment to human rights?

One of the main concerns will likely center around military aid to Saudi Arabia, specifically the sale of the top-of-the-line F-35 fighter jets that the US has recently shown willingness to sell to Israel’s newfound allies in the region. Yet, while the concern over Israel’s peril as a result of the sale would become a moot point were a normalization to occur, the ethical question of whether or not the United States should supply notoriously morally questionable individuals with lethal weapons remains. Consequently, when Israel’s relative airspace dominance and the presence of 5 American bases in Saudi Arabia itself are taken into account, the sale of more military supplies than usual to the Saudis is not a militarily necessity—even if a normalization of relations occurs. 

However, there is no equivocating over the fact that the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon grows with each passing day. Thus, President-Elect Biden must remain cautious if he intends to wholly reverse President Trump’s policy with Saudi Arabia. The United States relationship with Israel is one of a kind, and thus coordination on that level may not be possible with the Saudis in the near future. That being said, ramping up intelligence sharing between the CIA, Mossad, and the General Intelligence Directorate is a must. If Biden wishes to negotiate with the Iranians, there is still room for diplomacy if incorporated into a more comprehensive strategy to counter Iranian influence by creating widespread acceptance of democratic values throughout the region. Indeed, some baseline level of capitulation to the Saudis is needed if they choose to normalize relations with Israel. Yet, this necessity should not make President-Elect Biden lose sight of the very real possibility of incentivizing Saudi Arabian conduct consistent with international human rights law by withholding some degree of aid or cooperation.

Elijah Wiesman is a Beyond Boundaries student who plans to matriculate into the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at e.b.wiesman@wustl.edu