By Zachary Sorensen
On March 24 militants linked to the Islamic State initiated an attack on Palma, a coastal town in the Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique’s far North. Sporadic fighting ensued over the course of the next several days. Eventually, the militants overwhelmed the defenses of the town, endangering around two hundred foreigners as evacuation efforts were underway by helicopter and boat. While the damage from the attack remains uncertain, several dozen people are believed dead, many are unaccounted for, and an estimated 35,000 Mozambicans have been forced to flee the area. In April, government forces retook the town, though significant damage has been done and those forced to leave largely remain displaced.
The attack highlights a significant failure on the part of the Mozambican government to resolve an insurgency that has been simmering since 2017-a conflict that has resulted in over 2,000 deaths and 670,000 displacements. The Mozambican government needs to adopt a humanitarian-forward response to stabilize the situation, and the international community needs to encourage such a policy. Otherwise, not only will the militants continue to kill and displace people (not to mention recruit from sympathetic communities), but they will further derail the long term prospects of the country.
The formation of this insurgency mirrors some of the conditions that lead to the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. There, members of Al Qaeda in Iraq were able to form a substantial movement by taking advantage of poor economic conditions, endemic corruption, Sunni anger at the Iraqi Shia-led government, and the chaos of the Syrian Civil War to form a proto-State across much of Syria and Iraq-eventually splitting from Al Qaeda as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The militants-known as al-Shabaab or “the youth” (bearing no known connections to the Somali group of the same name)-are taking advantage of similar factors in Cabo Delgado. Cabo Delgado is a minority region (being 54% Muslim in a majority Catholic country), relatively poorer than the rest of the country (which is already fairly poor) and is also home to substantial drug trafficking operations.These factors have intensified as a result of natural disasters, internal displacement caused by fighting, and the Covid-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, the whole country struggles with significant corruption and governance issues. These factors further contribute to alienation and vulnerability that militants have been able to translate into limited territorial control.
The militants appear to have been targeting the town due to its role in supporting a nearby Total E&P natural gas project. Total, a major French oil and gas company, maintains a project site less than six miles away from Palma. The attack occurred on the same day that Total announced a resumption of construction activities after a December shutdown due to security concerns. The attack forced the company to resuspend construction activities. This project and other natural gas prospects in Cabo Delgado are vital to the economic future of Mozambique. In 2018, revenues from natural gas extraction from sites off of Cabo Delgado were estimated by the National Petroleum Institute of Mozambique to generate around $500 million dollars yearly for the state between 2021 and 2027, cresting a billion dollars a year between 2027 and 2031, and rising to between $2.7 and $3 billion dollars after 2034. This revenue would be extremely consequential to a country of around 30 million people with a gross domestic product of only $15.3 billion dollars. That said, the project must be completed in order for revenue to be generated and, despite assurances, the Mozambican government has clearly not been able to secure the area.
The response on the part of the government has, up to this point, been predominantly of a military nature. Not only has it not been particularly successful against the militant threat, but it has also responded to brutal attacks with a certain measure of its own brutality. Amnesty International has identified the militants, government forces, and government-aligned military contractors as carrying out war crimes on civilians. This sort of response, in addition to simply being immoral, can alienate the populace to the point of non-cooperation with the government or even supporting the militants-who, while brutal, engage in outreach efforts such as offering small business loans.
Restoring law to the Cabo Delgado province is vital going forward. That effort needs to be one that integrates the area’s populace and addresses the underlying conditions that have given way to violence. To this end, the Mozambican government should prioritize investments in Cabo Delgado and make visible efforts to improve living conditions. Additionally, as foreign actors determine how to help-sending military advisors for example-they should insist that this aid comes attached to monitoring and accountability of government forces in the region. More broadly, we should all be aware and proactive in dealing with what may be a movement aiming to create a new Islamic State in a receptive region.