By Collin McGovern
Recent international policy has witnessed the world’s major players toiling to implement renewable energy designed to safeguard against the environmental disasters that accompany rising temperatures. As democracies struggle to implement long-lasting reforms, the ever-authoritative CCP has seemingly thundered China towards climate oblivion, erecting scores of ozone-hungry factories across the mainland and in her megacities. Beijing’s economic ambitions stretch far beyond its borders; through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has funneled billions of dollars into economic projects in developing countries throughout Asia and beyond. Although the traditional narrative characterizes China as a crude economic colossus hell-bent on growth over environmental security, recent movements suggest that Chinese policy may be evolving in a more sustainable direction.
The BRI remains China’s capstone international program; by combining economic investment with foreign policy, Xi Jinping (China’s reigning general secretary) deftly fosters regional diplomacy and reaps the financial benefits of investing in rapidly developing markets. Internationalists ardently condemn the lack of environmental consciousness in BRI’s rapid investments, complaining that, by encouraging countries to embrace non-renewable energy sources like coal, China is gravely exacerbating climate change. An inspection of global energy investments by the Global Coal Finance Tracker (GCFT) reveals an evolving narrative, however. According to the GCFT, China accounts for merely 13% of financial investments in operational and under-development coal projects.
Not only is China a small player in the contemporary coal-financing arena (Japan is close behind in several metrics), but extensively developed plans for new installations have been scrapped completely in favor of sustainable facilities. Recent transactions show that hydropower is overtaking coal and fossil fuels as Beijing’s preferred energy investment. Research by the Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center shows that hydropower accounted for nearly 70% of China’s green energy investments abroad during the 2015-2019 period. In fact, shares of sustainable energy sources (wind, solar, and hydropower) in Chinese investments nearly rivaled non-renewable resources like coal, gas, and oil. However, utilization of these energy sources is not decreasing; power output using non-renewable resources remains at a comparable level to a decade ago, and China’s deadline for going carbon-neutral in 2060 is looser than nations of comparable economic might.
As China pivots towards sustainable foreign investments, its domestic policy reveals a style of forceful environmentalism. Air pollution haunts many of China’s megacities, a lingering malignancy of the mainland’s rapid economic growth during the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Domestic efforts to control smog have centered around a change in heating tactics, such as transitioning from coal to processed gas and administrative architecture designed to keep a closer eye on regions of high economic activity. Another consequence of China’s titanic productivity is copious amounts of trash, both industrial and personal. As elective waste-sorting efforts crumbled, Shanghai’s local government instituted mandatory waste-sorting policies in an effort to control street pollution and improve air quality. State coercion remains a staple of China’s domestic efforts to curb climate change and future-proof the economy; while free-market nations struggle to balance corporate interests with green politics, China can enforce environmental regulations on a massive scale.
Beijing is no stranger to intervening when markets disobey its commandments (as the CCP’s crackdown on American-listed Chinese technology firms reveals). China isn’t just imposing restrictions on industry; government buildings and projects are increasingly being outfitted with solar panels and sustainable technology. In fact, efforts to implement photovoltaic science on a national scale have resulted in China becoming the world’s largest market for solar energy, in the process driving prices for solar panels down due to increased production throughout the mainland. This is a boon for many developing countries funded by the BRI, who often can’t afford to implement it on a meaningful scale.
While China’s green streak continues to mature into concrete policy, the question of motivation remains at the forefront of international observers. It’s more realistic to label Beijing’s environmentalist efforts an act of national security rather than a noble attempt at contributing to international problem-solving. Global warming threatens several of China’s national interests. Changing climates threaten to sow instability in investment-rich Africa and South America. Sea levels could disrupt the construction of China’s naval armada in the South China Sea. Inoperable harbors could disrupt global trade routes necessary to capitalize on the mainland’s production potential, and so on. For now, a green China remains an imposing economic adversary for many Western countries, but a less menacing agent to environmental welfare on the global stage.