By Sean Chopra

It is often said that the Virginia governor’s race offers a small but accurate glimpse into what will happen in the national midterm elections the following year. If this is the case, then November 2, 2021, should make Democrats especially nauseous. Glenn Youngkin, who up until recently was known only to the finance world, was elected governor, which means for the first time in twelve years, Virginia voters elected a Republican to statewide office. 

This was an upset in every sense of the word. So how did Youngkin do it?

Youngkin managed not only to defeat a former governor of Virginia, Terry McAuliffe, who left office with an approval rating seventeen points higher than his disapproval, but he was also able to pull off a victory in a state Joe Biden carried by over ten points last fall. Even the pre-election polls had Youngkin trailing by at least three points in the days before. This was an upset in every sense of the word. So how did Youngkin do it? 

At the very beginning of the nominating process, the Virginia Republican Party understood that the state had not been kind to Trump or Trump-like candidates. To counter this, they instituted a kind of “ranked-choice voting” in which a candidate had to receive an absolute majority to be nominated. This was designed to prevent extremist candidates from receiving a nomination, as they had a worse chance of appealing to independents in the general election. This is exactly what played out in Virginia, as neither of the two most “Trumpy” candidates in the field, one of which likely would have won in a typical primary, were nominated.

Once nominated, Youngkin understood he faced a hurdle: How should he balance reaching back into the suburban areas that had rejected Trump while also keeping hold of the rural voters he needed to show up in big numbers for him to win? Former President Trump has repeatedly argued that voter fraud should be the priority issue for GOP candidates. If Youngkin claimed there had been widespread fraud in the last election, he would have alienated moderates, but if he didn’t, it was unlikely the Trump base would have turned out. So instead, he took more of a down-the-middle approach, declaring that the 2020 election was “legitimate,” and that Biden was the duly elected President, yet he continued to pay lip service to the election integrity issue by adding that “voting security needed improvement” . This was Youngkin’s strategy to keep Trump at arm’s length while he continued to appeal to his voting bloc. It should be mentioned that Youngkin never held a joint rally with President Trump, nor did he ever fundraise directly with him. He understood how toxic Trump’s brand had become, especially in the suburbs amongst the college-educated voters Youngkin needed to pull to his side.

As such, the Democratic Party’s dreams of maintaining their majorities, while slim, are still a real possibility.

The most successful political candidates select a winning issue to zero in on and ride that issue to victory. Trump did it with immigration. For Biden, it was Covid. For Glenn Youngkin, that issue was education. Youngkin recognized that this would be the perfect issue to merge the two groups he needed to win. Concerning the Trump base, he knew he could parrot concerns about Critical Race Theory (despite the fact Critical Race Theory is not actually taught in Virginia schools) and talk about mask mandates. For the independents and swing groups, he could discuss how he believed parents should “be involved” in their kids’ educations, and after his opponent, in a major debate gaffe, said that he didn’t think “parents should be telling schools what they should teach,” this education-based attack became even more effective. Youngkin took an issue that Democrats traditionally dominated and turned it into his signature campaign theme. One of the best ways to keep Trump at arm’s length is to keep the election local, and there is no issue more local than kids in classrooms.

Of course, even if Youngkin was trying to keep things local, it certainly did not hurt that the national winds were flying squarely against Democrats and in the direction of Republicans. Joe Biden’s approval rating was underwater eight points on election day, as people were angry about increasing inflation and policy inaction in Washington. Local elections have become increasingly national over the years, but especially in Virginia, which, due to its proximity to Washington, is impacted by the federal government more than any other state. When a Democratic president is doing poorly, the Democratic candidate for governor will suffer, as unfair as it might be.

In the aftermath of Youngkin’s victory, many commented that Republicans “have a blueprint” for how to win in 2022. I, however, am more skeptical. For one, the ranked-choice voting system which nominated Youngkin is not used in many other places, which means it is likely Trumpier candidates will emerge, which could be dangerous as Republicans seek to reclaim the suburbs. Furthermore, the main reason Trump was not more involved in the Virginia race was because he thought Youngkin would lose, and we know he does not like to back losers. However, Trump is unlikely to keep quiet a year from now, which means instead of focusing on winning issues like education, Republican candidates will be forced to continue relitigating the 2020 election, making it harder to bring back independents to the Republican Party. As such, the Democratic Party’s dreams of maintaining their majorities, while slim, are still a real possibility.