“Jazz it up! A new unit of the Korean Christian women’s movement is coming.” “On Massive Cultural Marxist.” “Youth Jinpyeongyeon launches – the next generation’s worldview war and the twilight of cultural Marxism.” These were the posts I saw on truthforum.kr, a habitat for South Korea’s far-right misogynists that have found a home online.

The opinions espoused in forums such as this one, while extreme, are not relegated to the fringes of South Korean political discourse. Like its counterparts in countries such as the United States, the country’s online right has aggressively expanded its presence, courting young and old alike, capitalizing on social grievances and feelings of anger, isolation, and hopelessness. While the causes from which such sentiments have emerged are different, they share one common element: President Moon Jae-in.

Ushered into office in 2017 in the wake of a corruption scandal that upended the country’s politics, Moon was viewed with optimism by South Korea’s young voters. In his first month in office, he recorded a 90 percent approval rating among those in their 20s after a landslide victory in that year’s presidential election. For this demographic cohort, the center-left Moon represented a break from the conservatism and corruption of the Park presidency.

Since then, however, the excitement and sense of empowerment many young people, particularly women, have felt over the past five years has been increasingly challenged by a right-wing wave, both on the internet and at the ballot box. Much of their excitement surrounding Moon was related not only to his pledges to put an end to the economic malaise that was hindering so many, but toward his declaration to “become a feminist president”. In the aftermath of the brutal murder of a woman in a Seoul restroom, the country’s progressives were eager to usher in an era of equality after centuries of patriarchy and a decade of right-wing governance.

The years since have demonstrated that any deviation from the prevailing conservative sentiment in the country very well may be the exception to the rule. Moon’s present support among Korean youth is a fraction of its 2017 levels, particularly among men, only 17 percent of whom approve of the president’s performance. The initial catalyst for this dramatic decrease was the country’s slow economic growth and high unemployment among those under 30. However, the economic strife these men are facing does not adequately explain their disgust with the president they once supported by an overwhelming majority. Rather, it masquerades the true motivation that many of them share.

Slow economic growth, coupled with income inequality and scarce opportunities for upward mobility, have proven to be fertile ground for the stoking of blame and resentment. As South Korea’s young men have seen their prospects for upward mobility dwindle, one movement in particular has become the primary scapegoat: feminism.

Various right-wing groups and personalities, both online and off, have taken advantage of this. San E, an anti-feminist rapper, has found a small but devoted following among men in their 20s. His song “Feminist” contains provocative lyrics such as “Korea has a gender pay gap of blah blah blah / fucking fake fact” and “Oh girls don’t need a prince / Then pay for half the house when we marry / “I’m no fucking prince”. Such vitriol is not limited to the music San E produces for his loyal fans. The internet, once seen as an opportunity for women to empower themselves by making their voices heard, is now being used to intimidate and silence them, with over 80 percent of South Korean women being subjected to misogyny online.

Despite the increasing prevalence of such views and the consequences they hold for women, anti-feminists insist their aim is not to achieve male supremacy. Bae In-kyu, the head of Man on Solidarity, insisted that “[anti-feminists] don’t hate women, and [they] don’t oppose elevating their rights. But feminists are a social evil”.

What are the effects of such claims? Young South Korean men have become the most conservative generation in their country. Journalist Cheon Gwan-yul and data scientist Jeong Han-wool found that 58.6 percent of men in their 20s are strongly opposed to feminism, 95.7 percent disagreed that “gender discrimination is the reason why Korean women earn less than men”, while 100 percent agreed with the statement, “today, discrimination against men is more severe than discrimination against women”.

The latter statement in particular influences their worldview and explains the precipitous gains the country’s main right-wing party, the People Power Party, has made among this section of the Korean population. Those supporting the new party often view themselves as the victims of reverse discrimination. They find a link between vanishing upward mobility and the increasing number of women in the workforce and universities. Few political conversions have been as successful as the one currently taking place in South Korea. As apparent as the consequences of the right’s online campaign are, its full effects have not yet manifested.