By Julian McCall
Artwork by Lea Despotis

Today, it’s easy to view nuclear war as a lesson of ancient 20th century history or a backdrop for apocalyptic novels. The nearly 80 years of nuclear peace since the attacks on Japan can pacify us into believing nuclear war is impossible. However, the lack of past nuclear war is not evidence that this will continue in the future. As we enter a unique geopolitical landscape, it would be foolish to not seriously consider the circumstances that could lead to untold destruction. 

Before we begin, it’s important to have a grasp of basic nuclear terminology and concepts. There are thought to be two main types of nuclear war, limited and full-scale. Limited nuclear war is characterized by “the minimal use of nuclear weapons by one or more parties to attack mainly military facilities” such as command structures and military forces. Full-scale nuclear war, on the other hand, seeks to completely destroy the target country, and makes no discrimination between military and civilian targets. 

Additionally, all nuclear weapons are not created equal. High-yield nuclear weapons, or “hydrogen bombs”, typically defined as having at least a 100-kiloton yield and “use atomic bombs to generate enough heat to cause nuclear fusion of hydrogen atoms.” Nuclear fusion is the same process that generates the immense heat of the Sun and refers to the destruction of atoms-the very building blocks of our universe.

In contrast, low-yield nuclear weapons, or “atom bombs,” typically have a yield of around 15 kilotons, comparable to the bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. These bombs use simple fission and are more likely to be used by emerging nuclear states like India and Pakistan. 

Below is a snapshot of global nuclear capabilities as sourced from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Report published in 2021.  

We can quickly identify a couple of categories of nuclear states. The United States and Russia alone hold the overwhelming majority of nuclear weapons and have hundreds of ways to launch them. There’s a variety of first-use policies – the United States, France, United Kingdom, and North Korea have explicitly stated that they are comfortable initiating nuclear conflict with varying caveats. China, and to a lesser extent Russia, have identified nuclear warheads as weapons of last resort.

In 2019, renowned realist international relations scholar John Mearsheimer gave a talk titled “The Great Powers and the Quest for Nuclear Advantage,” within it, he articulated four ways in which states seek nuclear advantage over their adversaries.  

According to Mearsheimer, the first scenario is the most optimal situation for any nuclear power: a “nuclear monopoly”, wherein they are the only country with nuclear weapons. This allows for great flexibility in military strategy, as possessing nuclear weapons with no fear of retaliation is a massive advantage. However, the brief moment of nuclear monopoly in the early post-WWII days is long gone. 

States must then settle for the second-best strategy – a “splendid first strike” capability. This refers to the ability for a country to launch debilitating first-strikes against their nuclear adversaries that effectively wipe out enemy nuclear arsenals. States would do this to preemptively eliminate the possibility of being nuked. This strategy is probable in a conflict between a great nuclear power and a minor one such as North Korea a limited number of nuclear warheads. 

The bronze medal of nuclear strategy goes to “damage limitation,” which like a splendid first strike, attempts to wipe out most enemy nuclear capabilities. Damage limitation, though, is unable to completely eliminate another nation’s arsenal. The aggressor state would effectively subject itself to receiving a retaliatory strike, though a state that engages in this strategy has likely determined that they have a good chance of surviving the retribution. This is a less than ideal course of action as it all but guarantees receiving nuclear attacks on military and/or civilian targets, but a country could engage in this strategy if they suspect an imminent enemy attack or to hedge against that risk.   

Lastly, a state could engage in what Mearsheimer calls “manipulation of risk,” where a country with a limited number of nuclear weapons and unable to engage in any of the earlier strategies could launch a couple of warheads towards remote enemy locations or uninhabited areas to “throw both sides on the slippery slope towards oblivion” and prompt a change in the behavior of their adversary. This could be done as an act of desperation if a state is facing massive attacks on its homeland or if its conventional strength is significantly weaker than its opponents. 

Thankfully, these nuclear strategies remain theoretical due to the past 77 years of nuclear peace. However, as we enter a multipolar world, there are important differences in the geopolitical landscape that could make nuclear war more likely in the future than it was during the Cold War, or America’s unipolar moment.  

During the Cold War, the two dominant nuclear powers-the United States and the Soviet Union-stood face to face and armed to the teeth on the Eurasian plateau. Though a few nuclear scares resulted from mutual unease and suspicion, both sides knew that any direct conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R would almost inevitably lead to nuclear Armageddon, thus rendering war between the great powers nearly impossible. 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, America stood in the unique historical position of being the sole global superpower, and for an entire generation, it stood unopposed militarily in every global arena. Because of America’s vast power, no country unhappy with the American-led order dared challenge American supremacy, and thus the likelihood of nuclear war plummeted. However, today that calculus is beginning to change.

The primary difference today is that rather than the unipolar world of the past 30 years, or the bipolar world of the 45 years beforehand, we are entering a multipolar world. There are now at least three nuclear-armed great powers – the United States, Russia, and China. Both Russia and China have demonstrated more ambitious attempts to disrupt or overturn the current global system, which alongside the geographic differences of conflict with China and the increasing parity between military powers make nuclear war potentially more likely.  

A war between the United States and China within the next decade is increasingly likely. There are several potential flashpoints, the largest being a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan. Whatever the spark that ignites the conflict, it is likely that warfare would be heavily centered around control of the East and South China Seas, as well as island chains in the region. Therefore, this fight will be overwhelmingly naval based. Maritime war in a relatively constrained space, especially at certain chokepoints, could make use of nuclear weapons less absurd. In tightly packed coastal regions, a high or low-yield nuclear weapon could wipe out significant portions of naval fleets with minimal civilian casualties. This likelihood could be increased if the United States engaged in missile attacks or air campaigns against the Chinese mainland along the seaboard, where the vast majority of the population and industries are located. 

Here we enter the land of pure conjecture, but there would be a logic for nuclear attack for both sides. The United States almost certainly has a first-strike capability, given that they have at least 15 times the number of warheads that China has. If they feared a Chinese nuclear attack or wished to destroy China’s political will – or destroy China period – they almost certainly could do so. The Chinese military themselves could theoretically launch limited nuclear attacks on enemy naval forces, though this would drastically increase the chances of their being nuked. They could also engage in preemptive “manipulation of risk” strategies to improve their chances of ending the conflict. 

There is no clear understanding of how any of these situations would play out. If, months or years into a conflict between the United States and China, the world received news that a Chinese nuclear torpedo wiped out several naval ships and caused the deaths of tens of thousands of U.S. naval sailors coupled with the unknown consequences of nuclear radiation in oceans that millions depend on for fishing, what would the reaction be? Would we immediately seek the quickest end to the war? Would people call for the annihilation of China in revenge? What if roles were reversed, or another nuclear scenario played out? We would quickly leave the cold calculus of military conflict and wrestle with existential questions of revenge, justice, peace, and the existence of humanity on this planet, and predicting any answers to those questions is simply impossible. 

Prospects of nuclear war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces including France and the United Kingdom against Russia are even more dismal, as it would likely escalate more quickly into full-scale nuclear war given the tight geography of Eurasia. However, the line between “limited” attacks on military forces and “full-scale” attacks on civilians is quickly blurred given the population density of Europe. Other conflicts concerning India and Pakistan, or North Korea would be no less deadly. 

I don’t mean to scare readers into thinking that nuclear war is imminent or inevitable. The fact remains that nuclear war is still highly improbable – but not impossible. I hope this serves as a wake-up call to the potential realities of great conflict between nuclear-armed states in the 21st century. Before we stumble into armed conflicts between nuclear powers, we must recognize that we have the power of God in our hands, and with that the ability to preserve or destroy the possibility of life for future generations.