On February 21, 2022, Vladimir Putin ordered his military into the Ukrainian breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk to “perform peacekeeping functions.” Three days later, Russian troops started a full-scale invasion of the country, the frontline stretching from Belarus to Crimea. Russia has, against all warnings, shattered the tenuous peace in Europe and largely united the West against it by making such an aggressive move. But why did Russia invade? While many analysts are trying to shed light on this question, it is important to remember that historically, Russia has continuously intervened in the affairs of its neighboring countries, either militarily or covertly. Let us not forget that Russia has been unofficially at war with Ukraine since 2014 following the invasion of Crimea and the uprisings in the Donbas. This full-scale invasion is by far the boldest move the Kremlin has made since the dissolution of the USSR but is not anything particularly new for them. When placed within the context of the Kremlin’s past actions in neighboring countries, readers will see that the Russo-Ukrainian war is only the latest attempt by Moscow to regain and maintain Soviet-era influence over policy in its near-abroad. 

Let us start with the Second Chechen war in the 1990s. For context, the First Chechen War was a conflict sparked by Chechen separatists’ declaration of independence from Russia in 1992. From 1994 to 1996, what was designed to be a quick pacification mission rapidly turned into a grueling war of attrition, in which both sides committed numerous atrocities. With many fewer restrictions on media coverage for news stations and a higher tolerance for political dissidence, public opinion turned against the war very quickly and the conflict ended in national humiliation. However, by 1999, Russian public opinion had turned against Chechnya, so when Russian soldiers repelled a raid by Chechen forces in their autonomous republic of Dagestan, it supplied the Kremlin with the perfect opportunity to re-invade. 

Re-invasion, combined with Russia’s tightened grip on media coverage of the war led to a much stronger and more durable war effort relative to the previous effort. This war led to a few important developments for Russia’s war machine; in contrast to the First, the Second Chechen War introduced media controls and wartime propaganda which helped to prime the Russian populace and keep them pro-war (or at least stay apathetic to it), by covering up the atrocities on the ground. This propaganda was, again, mobilized before the invasion of Crimea, this most recent stage of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and before Russian boots were sent in to quash protest movements abroad. This war was also the first that President Vladimir Putin, elected in 2000, presided over. It is no secret that Putin craved the respect and fear the Soviet Union commanded and he was eager to try to build up the Russian national image; the Chechen conflict gave him experience in doing so through military means. 

Russia’s next military move was an invasion of neighboring Georgia, in August 2008, dubbed the Georgia Crisis. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia had been struggling to contain secessionist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. When its forces decided to invade and reassert control over South Ossetia, Russia, which had nominally supported the breakaway regions, decided to intervene militarily. Their forces blitzed through the country and quickly subdued Georgian armed forces. 

This conflict led to a few developments in Russia’s favor. First, before the war, both Georgia and Ukraine had been openly flirting with the idea of joining NATO, which the Kremlin has long regarded as anti-Russia and an existential threat. The crisis indefinitely suspended Georgia’s accession to the organization and may have led to the election of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine, who ultimately took NATO ascension and EU membership off the table. It essentially showed Moscow how easy it could be to rapidly secure its interests through force. Second, Moscow was able to reign in Georgia’s actions covertly by occupying both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, giving the regions de facto independence. This means that Tbilisi has to go through Moscow to deal with territories it essentially sees as its own. If Georgian policy develops contrary to Moscow’s interests, the Kremlin can tighten the noose and encourage separatist activity in the regions. Lastly, in this conflict Russia performed a litmus test for Western reaction; the U.S., which was dealing with the financial crisis and a Presidential election, chose to try and “reset” relations with the Kremlin, without taking real punitive measures. Similar to the U.S., the European Union was hesitant to push through measures against Russia. The lack of response from either power only emboldened the Kremlin for future conflicts.  

The next time the Kremlin used its armed forces to try and secure its influence was following Ukraine’s 2013 Maidan Revolution. People reacted fiercely to then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s, a pro-Russian president, decision to refuse to sign the popularly anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union (following pressure from Moscow), which had the overwhelming support of Congress. Three months of intense protests followed by the occupation of government buildings, led the police to open fire on protesters. This volatile situation led to multilateral negotiations to bring stability back to the country. The short of the deal was that new elections were to be called and constitutional reforms were to be adopted, to reign in the powers of the president. Though there were rumblings that Yanukovych should remain president until an interim administration could be named, he was driven out of the country soon after the agreement’s signing (which Russia did not take part in). It was during the last days of this crisis, in February 2014, that Russia invaded and subsequently occupied Crimea. 

In August, an uprising in Ukraine’s Donetsk Oblast provided the next site of Russian activity. This pro-Russian uprising in Eastern Ukraine was quickly supported by Russian soldiers and Kremlin Wagner Group mercenaries. In fact, each time the Ukrainian forces threatened to regain full control of the Donbas, Russia increased the number of troops active in the region to tip the balance of power away from the Ukrainian army. These actions not only represent the commitment to micro-managing each of these conflicts in Ukraine, but also represent seedlings of the extreme measures Russia would subsequently take to keep Kyiv in its orbit; the occupation of Crimea and the uprisings in the Donbas came suddenly after Moscow’s interests were not met during negotiations. It seems that Russia’s retaliatory measures were meant to gain leverage over Kyiv, just as it had done in Georgia. Additionally, the crisis showed the Kremlin that Western support for Kyiv did not extend beyond financial sanctions. As long as Russia could weather the economic storm, it had a green card to do what it pleased in regard to its neighbors. 

Subsequently, following Belarus’ 2020 election, Russia sent military forces into the country. This time the mission was simple: keep Alexander Lukashenko in power. President of Belarus since 1994, his wins in the 2006, 2010, and 2020 elections sparked accusations of voting irregularity and undemocratic practices. Following the 2020 election, more than 200,000 Belarusians participated in protests that called on Lukashenko to resign, but he doubled down on his measures and used the county’s security forces to forcibly disperse the protests. During this crisis, Putin publicly offered to send in Russian troops to help pacify protesters. Though official numbers are hard to come by, Russian forces did enter Belarus for this reason and assisted Lukashenko and his Belorussian forces. The combined Russian and Belorussian forces rapidly regained control of the situation.  

In 2021, a similar situation happened in Kazakhstan. Following a hike in fuel prices, large-scale protests emerged and subsequently devolved from simple opposition to contemporary fuel policy to calls for the resignation of the president. Notably, some analysts identified the origin of the protests as driven by ethnic or tribal influences, rather than solely anger over national policy and lack of civil liberties, which adds another layer of complexity to this conflict. Either way, Russia sent a force of 2,500 troops to the country on the behalf of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to help assist the Kazakh authorities in restoring order to the country after government sites were attacked. It seems that in each of these cases, Russia was extremely wary to let these popular movements play out, for fear of seeing another Euromaidan-style “color revolution,” (which both Putin and the Kremlin’s foreign policy apparatus have repeatedly spoken out against) on its borders. The Western response, again, largely consisted of sanctions and rhetoric. 

This history reveals a few considerations to help us better contextualize this newest chapter of the Russo-Ukrainian war. First, while Russia has long lambasted “color revolutions,” large-scale protest movements which bring about an immediate change in government, in its neighboring countries for being destabilizing, we now see that that fear is rooted in neighboring governments becoming pro-Western, such as seen in Ukraine. If the operations in Belarus and Kazakhstan show anything, it is that Russia is now ready to forcibly stop what it labels as foreign-backed “street revolutions” to maintain the status quo. Another aspect worth mentioning is the speed at which Russia expected to conclude large-scale military operations in Ukraine; the war with Georgia, which lies fully in the Caucasus, lasted only five days. This could be one of the biggest contributing factors for why, in 2022, the Russian military received logistical support that could only support three to five days of conflict, after full-scale fighting broke out. Moscow was sure its forces could blitz through Ukraine, just as it did Georgia. 

Lastly, I should touch on some of the undercurrents of these conflicts. NATO expansion and protection of the Russian heartland (in case of a potential war with NATO) seem to underline the conflict with Ukraine. But let us not forget Putin’s other justification of the war, that Ukrainians and Russians are essentially the same people, and that Ukrainian statehood is a Western construct. Let us not forget the hidden undertones on NATO expansion that played out in the Georgia Crisis. Let us not forget the justification of protecting Russians abroad or regaining Soviet glory that have underlined the conflicts in Crimea and the Donbas. Let us not forget that Russia has, many times, called for the prevention of “street revolutions.” 

My point is this: Although the justification for taking strong measures in neighboring countries have been varied and evolved over time, at its heart Russia’s moves are those of a great power. This follows Putin’s desire to regain Soviet-level prestige to status; the first thing a country will do when it achieves great power status is to try and secure advantageous relations, using force if necessary, with neighboring countries to avoid anxiety over threats close to home. This is what the U.S. did in the 1800s and what China seeks to do now, though to a lesser degree. The possible fruition of this expansionary trend is particularly worrying. Unless there are drastic changes in Russian political thinking and policy, its leadership will continually intervene in the affairs of its neighbors. The repeated use of soldiers keeps the Kremlin on a track for continued conflict with the West, regardless of the outcome of this war.