Old Habits Die Hard in Haiti
Since Haiti’s independence from France in 1804, the United States has made a concerted effort to control politics and economics in Haiti to promote American interests in the Caribbean. Following the Haitian Revolution for independence, many southerners feared that slaves in America would take inspiration from the forceful expulsion of French colonialists. Slaveholders sought to prevent ideas of rebellion from crossing the Caribbean Sea, advocating for a trade embargo while the U.S. did not formally recognize Haitian independence for a further 60 years. Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. sought to manipulate Haitian affairs to create an outpost in the West Indies, leveraging its role as Haiti’s primary trade partner.
Despite leaving behind a highly centralized social and political structure, the legacy of the 1915 occupation was a racist, violent, and largely unsuccessful intervention that failed to prevent political and economic instability in the years following.
As the Haitian economy suffered under pressure from France, Germany and the United States, political instability boiled up, resulting in seven coups that rocked the island nation between 1911 and 1915. In the United States, racist and imperialist sentiments, combined with a desire to recoup Haiti’s debt, resulted in growing domestic pressure to intervene. When a pro-American president was deposed in 1915, President Woodrow Wilson ordered U.S. marines to occupy the capital, Port-au-Prince, and American corporations raced to take over the banks and railroads of Haiti to siphon wealth from its languishing economy. Under the American occupation, 40% of Haiti’s GDP was redirected to repay French and American banks, and although the U.S. established several important political institutions and infrastructure projects, many of them were built on the back of an abusive labor system of forcibly recruited Haitian workers. Although it produced a highly centralized social and political structure, the legacy of the 1915 occupation was a racist, violent, and largely unsuccessful intervention that failed to prevent political and economic instability in the years following the American’s withdrawal in 1934.
Despite this, when American troops arrived on Haitian shores in 1994, they were greeted with applause by the hopeful citizens of Port-au-Prince. Four years earlier, a leftist priest named Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in the first fully democratic election in Haitian history. As an anti-establishment candidate that drew support from the slums in Port-au-Prince, Aristide had powerful enemies among Haiti’s elite in the early days of his campaign. In 1990, before Aristide even took office, allies of François Duvalier, Haiti’s despotic president of the last 33 years, tried to overthrow him in a military coup. Although the first attempt was unsuccessful due to his popularity within Haiti’s slums, Aristide was deposed in a second coup just a year later, to be replaced with a tyrannical military junta that slaughtered thousands of Aristide’s supporters. The situation grew so dire that American President Bill Clinton was finally persuaded to intervene, and Operation Uphold Democracy sent nearly 25,000 troops to the island of 13 million.
Aristide was restored to power but was beholden to numerous stringent UN requirements in return for military support. Aristide was forced to reinstate many Duvalier allies into the government and adopt a strict “Structural Readjustment” economic policy common to many UN peacekeeping missions at the time. The program transformed Haiti into one of the most open economies in the world, which devastated domestic business and producers, especially farmers who could not compete with cheaper American goods. Aristide abolished the army in favor of a National Police Force drafted from his supporters in poor areas of the capital, and became increasingly paranoid, authoritarian, and corrupt as his fears of ouster grew. Aristide’s mismanagement and the Structural Readjustment program had devastating and long-lasting effects on the Haitian economy, which never recovered to its earlier heights. Operation Uphold Democracy officially ended in 1995 when the remaining American forces withdrew, leaving Aristide in a precarious position. Thus, the second American occupation of Haiti was no more successful than the first, failing to live up to its mission of maintaining democratic power in Haiti or preventing political turmoil and unrest.
Due to the suffering economy and accusations of corruption, Aristide’s popularity waned, and by 2004, he was no longer popular enough to prevent a coalition of business elites and military officers from removing him from power. This time, a joint UN peacekeeping mission was deployed, first using French and American troops that were later replaced with a multinational peacekeeping force. Spearheaded by the Brazilian Army, The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (known by the French acronym MINUSTAH) was able to establish relatively fair elections by 2006, but remained in the country amid controversy and conflict for another 15 years. During their time, MINUSTAH was plagued with accusations of sexual abuse, extrajudicial killing, corruption, and other crimes. UN soldiers fathered thousands of children with Haitian mothers, many of whom were raped and others who were compensated with the price of a single meal when the soldiers were repatriated. Additionally, an investigation traced a devastating cholera outbreak that killed tens of thousands of Haitians to a UN field base housing Nepali soldiers, who had been dumping wastewater into Haiti’s largest river, which acts as a water source for millions. The UN has been accused of trying to obscure the source of the outbreak that has sickened almost one million Haitians and has still not admitted full responsibility two decades later. As late as 2014, a UN auditor reported that a quarter of UN sites continued the practice of dumping waste in public canals some four years after the outbreak began.
In 2021, four years after UN troops left Haiti, President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated and replaced by Prime Minister Ariel Henry. Since his killing, conditions in Haiti have devolved into one of the world’s worst humanitarian and political crises. There has been no functional elected government and the last of Haiti’s parliamentary representatives ended their terms last year, with Henry failing to hold the elections he promised. Gangs have risen up to fill the power vacuum left by the lack of a central government, and have overrun the capital, controlling as much as 95% of Port-au-Prince and its infrastructure. Organized crime, massacres, and thousands of killings have been carried out by Haiti’s 200 gangs, which heavily outnumber and outgun the meager National Police Force. One group of gangs, known as the G9, commandeered the main fuel port in the capital in 2021, leaving millions without power or fuel needed to receive deliveries of fresh water. During this time, cholera returned with a vengeance, and the government failed to control gang violence or other national crises. In October 2022, Ariel Henry, who now rules by decree without a parliament or effective judiciary, called for foreign military intervention to regain control of the country. However, Henry has refused to hold elections and it is unclear how popular he is among Haitians, many of whom do not support international intervention due to its troubled history.
Thus, the second American occupation of Haiti was no more successful than the first, failing to live up to its mission of maintaining the democratic transition of power in Haiti or prevent political turmoil and unrest.
Regardless, in October 2023, the United Nations Security Council once again approved an armed international force to reestablish control of Haiti’s capital. The initiative, which is funded primarily by the U.S., would send 1,000 police officers and soldiers, mainly from Kenya, to support the Haitian National Police. Across three previous examples of foreign intervention in Haiti, the U.S. has clearly not learned from its failure to instill lasting and meaningful stability. However, it has learned, beginning with the 2004 UN peacekeeping mission, to outsource as much of the dirty work as possible.
Kenya has participated in several UN interventions in Namibia, Kosovo, Tigray, and Somalia, trading the costly and high-risk task of deploying soldiers for political capital. By establishing itself as a reliable ally for UN nations, Kenya can try to leverage these alliances for favorable economic conditions. Additionally, Kenyan police will receive specialized training, equipment, and UN pensions that will contribute significantly to the Kenyan economy and security forces. Kenya’s high court announced on November 9 that it will not deploy troops until it has received all the funding and training promised under the UNSEC initiative, but it also reaffirmed its commitment to helping the ailing Haitian people. For the United States, this outsourced intervention provides an opportunity to further western interests in democracy and security without risking controversy or American lives.
Despite these bad memories, many Haitians find the realities of everyday life so appalling that they see no other option but to turn their gaze outwards looking for salvation.
It is difficult to predict how effective a Kenyan intervention in Haiti will be, but numerous groups in Haiti, Kenya, and the international stage have raised concerns. Many Haitians are resistant to the idea of foreign intervention, but a large contingent have grown too desperate to see another option, so support for the mission remains unclear. The Kenyan police also have a blemished human rights record, including accusations of shooting protesters during COVID-19 lockdowns, and do not speak Creole or French, so it is unclear how effectively they can coordinate with local forces on the ground. Kenyan officers are also not trained for urban warfare and have no experience fighting gangs like the ones that control nearly all of Port-au-Prince.
Foreign troops have occupied Haiti for 41 of the last 108 years, and despite billions of dollars in humanitarian aid, military equipment and economic support, these efforts have failed spectacularly to stabilize and rejuvenate Haiti. Considering the dysfunction of Haiti’s government, health services, and security forces, the squalid conditions left in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, and the ensuing cholera outbreak, it is difficult to imagine the underprepared Kenyan police faring much better. The United States and other western countries have been reluctant to commit significant resources, funding, or personnel to Haiti, leaving behind an unpredictable and multinational peacekeeping force reminiscent of the disastrous 2004 mission. Despite this checkered past, many Haitians find the realities of everyday life so appalling that they see no other option but to look outward for salvation.
Toby Zimmerman ‘27 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at t.zimmerman@wustl.edu.