Recent years have been packed with news about America’s enemies growing more aggressive. Russia invaded Ukraine. China dialed up tensions with Taiwan. Iran pushed several of its proxies to escalate attacks against Israel. Venezuela declared ownership of territory in Guyana. Serbia clashed with forces in Kosovo. North Korea fired hundreds of shells to intimidate South Korea. Considering these recent events, a fair conclusion (at least on the surface) would be that anti-American governments do not seem afraid. Is US military power really falling short as a deterrent? If so, what does this mean for the state of the West’s preparation for a potential third World War, specifically against the rapidly growing Chinese military?
I am not arguing that NATO — or even the US on its own — is less prepared for World War III than its enemies are. The West still boasts more effective militaries than its adversaries, including China (which has surpassed all other threats). Assuming that our leaders can prevent a nuclear exchange, defeating China’s forces would be a certainty if we are supported by any of the governments likely to join a war against them (India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc.). Despite this, there are still reasons for concern that we’re less ready than we need to be.
The issue is that if World War III starts, everyone will lose — even if our enemies suffer greater losses, the cost of ensuring such a result would be so horrific that this outcome is not good enough. Preventing a global conflict is the only acceptable goal, and this requires leverage through indisputably unmatched strength. This article is meant to address whether we have the strength to “win” by such a large margin that we can deter a World War in the first place. Skipping straight to the punchline, I want to explain how our once-uncontested might is slipping away, and explore the reasons behind this.
Put bluntly, the West has been complacent ever since the end of humanity’s greatest arms race — the Cold War. While the conflict impacted far more than attitudes toward national security, this chapter of history was shaped by two superpowers doing everything they could to prepare for a third World War in a competition that lasted nearly half a century. After the free world won and the USSR collapsed under its own weight, Western leaders began struggling to justify the immense cost of maintaining a military with such capabilities, let alone expanding it.
The next several decades included numerous examples of intervention in Latin America and the Middle East, but none of them demanded equipment rivaling the scale or sophistication that would have been essential for overpowering the Soviets. With a handful of exceptions (notably the Gulf War), the post-Cold War era marked a shift toward specializing in asymmetrical warfare rather than wars against conventional militaries. This change in goals was immeasurably heightened by 9/11 and the subsequent Global War On Terrorism, which has generally defined national defense up until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
So, what are the differences between our capabilities now and when we still felt the Cold War’s pressure for commitment and innovation? By the early 90s, our military was, in every sense, built to clash against empires. Today, we have sacrificed investment in equipment with limited use outside of near-peer wars to pick up the slack for our European allies, who have indulged in social services at the expense of proactive spending on security. We’re often reminded that, in Europe, healthcare is more accessible and public transportation is more extensive. This is partly because of higher taxes, but can also be explained by the fact that these nations simply don’t spend anywhere near as much on defense. Unsurprisingly, no less than 20 of the 32 NATO members are failing to dedicate the required 2% of GDP to their country’s military budget.
For years, European governments have reassured themselves that the US would come to their rescue while shrugging off any possible value to autonomy. The West finally had its wakeup call to change this trend of complacency during the rally to support Ukraine, when the EU quickly realized how dependent it was on American involvement to have meaningful influence on the war. Some might assume that US officials take no issue with this dynamic because we supposedly benefit from having more power than our allies. On the contrary, this reliance has left a clearly negative impact on American interests. A striking example is what remains of our fleet of strategic bombers.
Currently, we have three types of planes in this fleet: the B-52 Stratofortress, the B-1B Lancer, and the B-2 Spirit. These aircraft offer nothing short of incredible firepower, but they’re aging, and it shows. The Air Force has not added a single new plane to its fleet of strategic bombers in decades. Our latest B-52s were all manufactured in the early 1960s, and the B-1Bs filling hangers today were made in the 1980s. The B-2 cost so much more than expected that we gave up on building them in 2000, despite not reaching the quantities Congress had planned. This lack of production means that the fleet is noticeably shrinking because flight-hours wear out planes just as mileage does for cars. All moving parts eventually break and need replacement, so, inconveniently, it is not possible to use any single aircraft indefinitely.
This inevitable shelf life for strategic bombers is only worsened when you account for crashes during training exercises, let alone the risk of aircraft getting shot down in combat. As a result, whenever we lose one of these planes, it is gone for good. Our remaining inventory reflects this problem. We currently have 72 B-52s — less than one tenth of the total 744 that were built during the Cold War. To put in perspective just how small that number is, the first night of the Operation Linebacker II bombing campaign involved no less than 129 B-52s at once. Additionally, today the Air Force has just 45 B-1Bs — fewer than half of the 104 originally produced. Finally, we only finished construction for a mere 21 of the 132 planned B-2s, and one of those bombers was destroyed in a takeoff accident.
If these figures don’t concern you, you probably assume that there is some justification behind the Pentagon allowing this fleet to deteriorate so dramatically, and that it would not be happening if it mattered. There are multiple reasons why the Air Force’s selection of strategic bombers is shrinking but understanding them will not provide any reassurance. The first explanation comes from the purpose of these aircraft: they were originally designed to drop nuclear payloads, but (to the benefit of all humanity) this role obviously never became a reality, so strategic bombers have been kept relevant by a different task. In practice, they are instead used to deliver the greatest possible amounts of conventional ordnance. During conflicts against insurgent groups, the increased range and capacity offered by strategic bombers (compared to smaller fighter jets) is rarely necessary, and the cost to fly and maintain them is significantly higher. Further, they’ve become especially poorly suited for asymmetrical warfare thanks to the development of smart bombs, which are precise enough to render carpet bombing (such as during the Vietnam War) obsolete.
These factors have allowed the US military to avoid the consequences of neglecting our strategic bomber fleet so far. But if it isn’t addressed soon, it will create an alarming vulnerability. This type of aircraft will play an indispensable role in wars against other modern militaries by launching cruise missiles in larger volumes and from farther distances, while being kept in bases that are out of range of runway attacks. These features make strategic bombers by far the most effective delivery system for volleys of cruise missiles, which are the single best tool for achieving air superiority, destroying artillery batteries, damaging airfields, and sinking enemy ships before they can threaten our own naval forces. The Center For Strategic International Studies emphasized this in a report titled “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” Here, the CSIS advised to “prioritize sustainment of the bomber fleet over fighters,” cautioning that “the Air Force will need as many bombers as it can get.” Put simply, we haven’t needed a particularly impressive fleet of strategic bombers for the Global War On Terror, but we absolutely need one to ensure a peaceful future with China.
Maddeningly, strategic bombers are not the only category where the US military is cutting corners compared to previous figures. Another example is the Seawolf-class submarine — a massive nuclear sub that could dive deeper, move faster, make less noise, and carry more weapons than any other in the US Navy. Like the B-1B and B-2, their performance was phenomenal, but deemed excessive after the dissolution of the superpower that they had been designed to outmatch (especially when each submarine cost the equivalent of $5 billion). Accordingly, 90% of the planned fleet was canceled in the 1990s, leaving only three Seawolfs in operation to this day. Yet another example is the lack of innovation and slowness in replacing 1970s-era Nimitz-class aircraft carriers with the more modern Gerald R. Ford-class, but I digress.
The bottom line is that the West has been complacent with its commitment to military deterrence. Europe’s unimpressive arms procurement has left a void for the US to address with resources that could otherwise fund more ambitious projects. The consequences are already unraveling as we speak, and if we do not fix this trend, the power gap will not be wide enough to prevent another World War. When it comes to how we can solve this problem, that topic warrants its own article.
Alex Lee ‘25 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at alex.b.lee@wustl.edu.