In 2021, a coup staged by Myanmar’s powerful military rocked the nation. After about a decade of flirtation with civilian rule, the coup ousted the democratically elected government and installed military leaders at the helm of the country. The junta subsequently declared martial law and jailed political opponents. What followed has become a bloody civil war between the military junta and many armed ethnic groups that feel oppressed and wish to move back towards a democracy. The most powerful group within the junta’s opposition is the Triple Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance of three distinct ethnic groups all seeking to end military rule. In October 2023, the Triple Brotherhood Alliance launched “Operation 1027”, a massive offensive push against government forces. They found major success in the first months of 2024 as they took large tracts of land in the border regions of Myanmar, pushing government forces into urban centers and central Myanmar. Consequently, the military has faced desertion and low morale by their troops as the opposition closes in.
China initially verbally supported Operation 1027 as they saw it as an opportunity to solve a domestic problem with the city of Laukkaing. Laukkaing is a city in Myanmar near the border with China known for harboring cyber-scam and human trafficking operations targeting Chinese nationals. With little diplomatic opposition, the Three Brotherhood Alliance captured the city from a pro-junta militia. However, when they attempted to launch “Operation 1027 pt. 2” in July 2024, they faced much more diplomatic pushback from the Chinese government. Although junta-Chinese relations were poor at the start of this year, China understands that the collapse of the junta would bring additional chaos and threaten the ability for the Chinese to advance key goals in the region, such as ensuring Chinese access to the Indian Ocean. As a result, China has cut off some trade to rebel-controlled areas, leading to shortages of supplies and other materials while also blocking rebel troops from entering the country to receive medical treatment. At the same time, a potential defeat of government forces has never materialized as the Junta continues to secure their lines and recruit new troops.
We can be certain that China will play a significant role in the outcome [of the war] and maintain influence in whatever government emerges.
In short, the civil war in Myanmar is far from over and it is still unclear what the country will look like when it concludes. However, we can be certain that China will play a significant role in the outcome and maintain influence in whatever government emerges. There are many reasons why they wish to maintain a strong say in Myanmar. First, there are material interests. One of the only natural gas pipelines to China’s southwestern provinces runs through Myanmar. This makes it strategically significant and a piece of infrastructure the Chinese government will want to ensure is consolidated under their control. Second, China will look to monitor and protect trade in regional waterways. A strong ally in Myanmar means a stronger friendly presence in proximity to the Malacca Strait where critical trade passes from China to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The long-term ability to utilize Myanmar’s ports will give China greater ability to attempt to police the strait and further exercise greater access to the Indian Ocean. All of these facts should look concerning to countries like the US and the Philippines, because as tensions in the South China Sea escalate, Chinese control over another strategic hub in the region could make it more difficult to counter their actions.
China may be able to force concessions out of the military regime in exchange for support in the junta’s war against the ethnic groups. This is especially relevant now after a year of war in which the junta has suffered a series of defeats, but remains strong enough to assure China they are not on the verge of collapse. These concessions could come in the form of oil, gas, or mineral rights, as well as more trips from the Chinese navy to the ports of Myanmar. At the end of 2023, a Chinese detachment of 3 ships visited Myanmar in a gesture of goodwill to the military regime. Although the US should work to counter Chinese influence in the region, doing so will be tricky. Diplomatically supporting the ethnic groups is not viable both because there are too many and because multiple have taken part in horrific human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing. The US is better off strengthening existing partnerships in the region with countries such as India, Singapore, and Japan. Although not discussed nearly as often as other countries in the context of Chinese-American relations, China’s increasing involvement in Myanmar’s civil war could make it the next geopolitical hotspot in the years and decades to come.
Weldon Smith ‘27 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at s.weldon@wustl.edu.