Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was one of the first world leaders to congratulate President-Elect Trump last month, demonstrating India-U.S. relations have come a long way since President Eisenhower’s visit to India in 1959. Despite some tension during the cold war, ties between the two countries have significantly improved over the past decade. Support for India has consistently remained bipartisan in American politics despite the increasing divide over a variety of other issues. This is a telling sign on the importance of India-US relations in the global paradigm.
Regardless of an overall sense of confidence in New Delhi about Trump’s second term, India must prepare to navigate a volatile presidency. Over the course of the next four years, the following five aspects of the India-U.S. relationship will be at the forefront: Defense, China, Trade, Foreign policy, and Indian domestic politics.
Support for India has consistently remained bipartisan in American politics despite the increasing divide over a variety of other issues.
The United States is India’s fourth largest arms source with defense trade crossing $2 billion in 2020. This exchange ranges from 24 MH-60R Seahawk anti-submarine helicopters to the transfer of technology from Lockheed Martin to Indian contractors because of growing concerns over China’s increasing maritime presence in the Pacific. Additionally, in 2018, the Trump administration added ‘Indo’ as a suffix to the U.S. military’s Pacific Command and a year later the Department of Defense recognized India as a ‘key regional partner’ in their Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. As a result of this increased collaboration, India has pushed for the co-production of defense technology rather than direct purchases of military equipment. However, a Trump administration may pose a challenge to this ideal. As C. Raja Mohan, an Indian journalist and foreign policy analyst aptly phrases it, “The USA has operated under the assumption that boosting India’s capabilities is in America’s self-interest, especially in balancing China, but Trump is likely to demand some Indian ‘pro’ for American ‘quid.’” This stems from Trump’s policy framework shifting to intensely transactional as well as his goal to overhaul America’s role in the global order. While this may result in reduced free lunches and more negotiations, defense cooperation is likely to continue.
One reason the Trump Administration is likely to collaborate closely with India is China, a country that has always been central to the U.S.’s engagement with India. India is increasingly concerned about China’s growing presence in South Asia and the U.S. is seeking to counter China’s increasing global influence. This has resulted in a strategic convergence that may lead Trump to deepen geopolitical engagement with India and the QUAD, a group of nations comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia. This group was revived in 2017 once Trump entered the Oval Office.
However, India and the US differ over certain aspects of the China challenge. The key difference arises from India’s disputed northern border with China in the Himalaya Mountains. Hence, India has sought to engage with China through a mix of cooperation and competition, the ratio of which contradicts Trump’s vision. Hence, it is uncertain whether the QUAD grouping will come together in a military context rather than simply a political dimension.
In addition to defense, India is also affected by America’s trade policies with China. For example, an extreme version of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy may result in the United States imposing a broader adjustment tax, underinvesting in its military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, or reaching some kind of accommodation with China that bypasses India. Further, an outsized tariff on Chinese goods may help to drive more trade to countries like India, but only if this tariff is directed China solely.
Given this high degree of uncertainty in U.S.-China relations, India must consider doubling down on its Act East policy as a safeguard incase trade with the U.S. takes a turn for the worse. This proposition was first articulated by the Bharatiya Janata Party in the 1990’s to deepen India’s connectivity with supply chains in Southeast Asia. India’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific and its key role in counterbalancing China has secured its place in future U.S. relationships despite Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy.
Trade, in fact, plays a much larger role than defense in India-U.S. relations and has been one of the sticking points under Trump’s administration. While security ties between New Delhi and Washington are likely to remain stable, the same cannot be said about their trade relations. In his first term, Trump pushed this relationship as far as he could without breaking it. For example, the Trump administration terminated India’s preferential trading status under the Generalized System of Preference that previously allowed Indian businesses to export products duty-free to the United States. India retaliated by raising duties on some American products. On a larger scale, Trump’s isolationist and protectionist tendencies could particularly impact the technology, IT, pharmaceutical, and textile sectors, leading to a dangerous slippery slope of a potential trade war.
On the one hand, disruptions in supply chains caused by the recent American elections open a window of opportunity for India to attract foreign investment. This complements the decade-long trend of companies such as Apple setting up manufacturing bases in India as they look to diversify production from China. However, some analysts believe that Trump could take a different approach and focus on a philosophy of onshoring that brings manufacturing back to the USA. This is in stark contrast to Biden’s policy of “friendshoring” that encouraged American companies to produce in friendly countries. Overall, the transition from Biden to Trump is likely to steer American companies away from manufacturing in India, reducing foreign investment.
Trump’s views on immigration are as unpredictable as they are riotous resulting in widespread concern over the future stability of Indian immigrants.
Another point of contention is a substantial increase in immigration of Indians to the U.S. over the past two decades. As of 2020, according to the Asian-American Pacific Islander, a census agency in the United States, the Indian-American population in the U.S. is 4.4 million, making them the largest single-origin Asian group in the country. Trump’s views on immigration are as unpredictable as they are riotous resulting in widespread concern over the future stability of Indian immigrants. As of today, Indians are the largest recipients of H1-B work visas, especially in the tech sector and Trump is expected to continue imposing stringent limits on these visas like he did in his first term.
Regarding Indian foreign policy, the United States’ role as a global policeman has impacted the way India manages their relationship with other countries. When it comes to India’s development, the U.S. remains the most important external factor, but India is likely to seek deeper cooperation with other countries. Beginning with the Pacific, New Delhi is keen on retaining its defense ties with Japan as well as a time-tested partner in Russia. As a result, India has refused to join Western sanctions against Russia or condemn the war in Ukraine. While these positions have historically been bothersome to those in Washington, Trump’s less confrontational approach to Russia may make India’s balancing act between Moscow and Washington easier.
Additionally, a partnership with Iran provides India the possibility of access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Additionally, the Gulf Arab states and Israel have risen as more promising partners in India’s security and commercial calculus. Although the depth of India-Iran relations has often been exaggerated by both parties and external observers, there has been a steady level of cooperation, one that is also expected to extend to Afghanistan. Iran was also a major supplier of gas to India until this relationship was affected by American-led international sanctions linked to Iran’s nuclear program. As a result, recent years have seen India divest from Iran and shift their focus towards the Gulf states that have yielded more fruitful partnerships.
International terrorism is the arm of American foreign policy that is most relevant to the Middle East and India. The United States and India hold common principles on terrorism, but the practicalities of cooperation have proven to be more complicated. If India wants the U.S. to be more sympathetic towards its goals in the disputed border land of Kashmir between India and Pakistan, New Delhi is expected to bring more to the fight against ISIS. Hence, a tricky balancing act for India in the Middle East will therefore become harder in the years to come.
Looking inward at domestic Indian politics reveals a more sinister reason for New Delhi’s apparent optimism in a Trump presidency. Over his tenure, as Trump took a sledgehammer to established norms at home and abroad, India found a space to push its own hard-edged agenda in Kashmir without worrying about American hectoring. Indeed, it is hard to imagine New Delhi revoking Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy in as heavy-handed a way as it did if a Democrat occupied the oval office. Trump’s leniency towards India is a direct result of the flattery employed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi as an alternative to substantial statecraft.
Overall, the United States and India have the most apparent strategic convergence under defense and security, but clash over trade and immigration. This reflects the reality of democratic relationships that prefer partnership over alliance. Both countries view themselves as stewards of the relationship rather than transformers, subverting the traditional proxy-principal relationship the United States employs with other developing countries that has historically led to political bullying and appeasement politics. Despite their differences, the logic of converging interests is supplemented by a concrete set of shared core values. Having said that, a second Trump presidency underscores a complex setting for India in all aspects of their relationship.
Husain Master 27 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at h.a.master@wustl.edu.