For over 30 years, the US has been unquestionably stronger than any opponent to our national interests — the People’s Republic of China is bringing those days to an end. The underlying source of tension between the US and China is Bejing’s territorial dispute with Taiwan. Since 1949, both nations have rejected the other’s autonomy, only resorting to peace because they lack the strength to continue the civil war that never officially ended. While Taiwan has grown content to coexist under separate governments, mainland China regularly demonstrates its disdain for the status quo. In 2022, China forced Taiwan to scramble jets by sending 1,727 warplanes into its Air Defense Identification Zone, including a strategic bomber capable of dropping nuclear weapons. In recent decades, this delicate balance of power has sharply turned in China’s favor, while Taiwan’s de facto independence has become indispensable for the US, as more than 90% of the world’s most advanced microchips are made in Taiwan.
These are essential for countless industries, from day-to-day commodities, to the infrastructure that our economy depends on, to the military needed to guarantee national security and global stability. More concretely, the West relies on Taiwanese microchips to build cars, smartphones, dishwashers, commercial airlines, hospital equipment, fighter jets, and air defense missiles, among other necessities. Despite recent efforts to expand microchip production elsewhere, losing Taiwan’s supply would be a disaster. Solidifying the stakes of this dilemma, Taiwan has warned it will destroy its microchip manufacturing facilities if China attempts an invasion. The bottom line is that China’s aspirations to seize Taiwan are simply unacceptable, which amounts to war between the US and China seeming uncomfortably difficult to avoid.
The cost of war with China
The worst possible outcome of escalating tensions is a nuclear exchange, but everyone knows how that would end. Instead, let’s unpack the second-worst scenario — a full-scale non-nuclear war. As an island, an invasion of Taiwan would be determined heavily by naval and air power. In contrast to Ukraine, armored vehicles, infantry, and artillery would be far less relevant, especially until Chinese forces reach the shore. Along with geography, history can also indicate how this conflict might unfold. In the case of both previous World Wars, a decisive outcome only came after several years of fighting — the next one seems likely to follow suit.
China’s aspirations to seize Taiwan are simply unacceptable, which amounts to war between the US and China seeming uncomfortably difficult to avoid.
Considering that WWII was nearly a century ago and military technology has changed immeasurably since then, it might sound strange to use it for predicting a future clash between superpowers. However, nearly all post-WWII conflicts were either counterinsurgency campaigns or one side could take absolute control of the airspace, making them poor comparisons for a theoretical war with China. The handful of exceptions, namely the Iran-Iraq War and Russo-Ukraine War, followed this trend of dragging on, despite technological advances.
Therefore, it’s worth noting how the US and our allies won WWII: by building more equipment than the Axis. At the time, our factories could make a Sherman tank within 30 minutes. Europe also caught on to the importance of mass production — from the Soviet T-34 tank to the British Sten submachine gun, cheap equipment defined successful war efforts, even in the face of superior designs. The takeaway is that subpar weapons that are ready when they’re needed are more useful than sophisticated weapons that haven’t been built yet. Accordingly, assessing how wars could play out is more complex than comparing two militaries and declaring that the stronger side would win — among other factors, we need to factor in each country’s manufacturing abilities.
The data on this topic is beyond unsettling given the likely importance of navies, air forces, and numerical strength. Each year, China adds five times more warships to its fleet than we do. This would be alarming enough, but it only scratches the surface of the threat after considering how civilian expertise and infrastructure can be adapted for military needs during wartime. The US accounts for .2% of global shipbuilding; China accounts for more than 50%. The vessels we build annually weigh about 100,000 tons in total; China’s are measured in the tens of millions. The US has only 13 million manufacturing workers (3.8% of our population); China has over 100 million (7.4%). Even if we combine the capabilities of the US and Europe, it’s difficult to overstate how far ahead China’s shipbuilding is.
Subpar weapons that are ready when they’re needed are more useful than sophisticated weapons that haven’t been built yet.
Beyond outproducing our ships, China also poses the biggest challenge to US air power. It’s the only other nation to make multiple stealth aircraft, successfully mass produce a stealth fighter, or create flying prototypes for a 6th-generation fighter jet. China builds the J-20, its counterpart to the American F-35, at a rate of 100 aircraft per year. This is fewer than the annual 150 F-35s from the U.S., but many of the latter are exported to allies, while China retains every J-20 for itself. No less alarming than China’s measures to get more modern jets off the assembly lines are its measures to get more off the ground. China is building air bases and fortified runways along the coast facing Taiwan. Meanwhile, American pilots would depend on either aircraft carriers or bases in less convenient locations, such as Japan. On the same note, it’s no coincidence that China is testing missiles on targets built to the same shape and size as American aircraft carriers.
While China has demonstrated that its equipment can surpass ours in numbers, the same is not true for quality.
Can we change this?
An easy conclusion is that China is growing stronger because we don’t throw enough money at the problem. Indeed, if the US grasps the severity of Bejing’s rise to power, our defense spending indicates otherwise. According to Econofact, military spending varied throughout the Cold War, but our government never committed less than 4.5% of GDP, and surged to nearly 14% and 10% during the Korean War and Vietnam War respectively. By contrast, defense spending decreased to 3-4% after the Cold War, suggesting that the US doesn’t see China as a threat comparable to the USSR. While returning to Cold War-rates of military spending is necessary, today’s deficiencies go well beyond inadequate funding. We also need Congress to reform the process of rebuilding our military by making our spending more efficient. For example, American shipbuilding has become practically unworkable in ways that only legislation can fix.
Unlike China, the US no longer subsidizes shipyards. These Cold War-era subsidies were vital for keeping shipyards in business, as military contracts inevitably fluctuated (and outright plummeted after the Soviet Union dissolved), necessitating sales of civilian ships. Unsubsidized, US shipyards struggled to sell commercial vessels in competition with foreign labor prices and regulations. As a consequence, 7 major shipyards remain of the 60-70 that we operated in past decades.
The need for legislative change goes further, as our shipyards have also grown notorious for budget overruns. To put the sheer dysfunctionality of our shipbuilding into perspective, South Korea makes the same quality Aegis destroyers as the US at 3 times the rate and half the cost. The problem partially results from a lack of accountability to meet deadlines after contracts are signed. Along with improving accountability, Congress can drive down costs with certain deregulatory measures. For example, the US Navy is legally barred from using warships built in other countries, and only US citizens can work on warship construction. These policies enable monopolistic price-gouging and deprive us of high-skilled labor from allied nations.
Reasons for optimism
It’s disturbing that the US can’t match China ship-for-ship, and that changing this trend seems unsurmountable. Fortunately, with the right alternatives, this might be unnecessary to ensure Taiwan’s safety. Ukraine has developed inexpensive sea-drones that are a nightmare for Russia’s navy, suggesting that modern fleets can essentially be countered by unmanned speedboats filled with explosives. Similarly, the US is testing unmanned submarines like DARPA’s sonar-resistant Manta Ray, which analysts believe could sneak past ships while deploying sea mines and torpedoes.
Building these drones would cost less than crewed vessels and could substantially compensate where our navy falls short, but the US is also investing in other budget-options for deterring China. We’re working on anti-ship missiles compatible with HIMARS launchers, which Taiwan already has. Development for our new stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider, is on schedule. These would be exceptionally difficult to shoot down and could carry the new Quicksink system — a ship-targeting modification for guided bombs. Arguably the most promising development is the Rapid Dragon program. This would allow cheap and numerous cargo planes to destroy warships by parachuting out pallets of cruise missiles, which then launch mid-descent. Individually, none of these could offset the staggering manpower and material that China is positioned to muster, but their combined capabilities might be enough.
Further, while China has demonstrated that its equipment can surpass ours in numbers, the same is not true for quality. Excluding weapons based on Soviet designs, Chinese equipment has barely been tested in combat, and it’s never been used against an organized military. This means we can only speculate about its functionality, and available anecdotes paint an unimpressive picture. According to RAND Corporation, Nigeria, Myanmar, and Bangladesh all complained about how their Chinese fighter jets perform, and Pakistan is dissatisfied with their Chinese warships. A similar story came after Jordan bought CH-4B drones — China’s copy of the MQ-9 Reaper — in 2016, and discarded them after 3 years of frustration.
Conclusion
With no way to disentangle ourselves from Taiwan, the disturbing reality is that war with China is possible. A war so destructive can only be “won” if it’s prevented from breaking out. Complacency has rendered us less prepared to maintain peace than we should be — we need to get our act together immediately.
Alex Lee ‘25 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at alex.b.lee@wustl.edu.