In April of 2024, the U.S. Navy published a report detailing the delays for many of their cutting-edge warships currently in the planning or production phase. Nearly all were delayed between one and three years, even among projects that carry the highest priority. The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine is considered key to maintaining America’s nuclear deterrence and is designed to replace the aging Ohio-class starting at the end of the 2020s. The first Columbia-class submarine was contracted to be delivered in October 2027 but is now expected at least 12 to 16 months later, jeopardizing the Navy’s plan to retire one Ohio-class submarine a year beginning in 2028. Block IV of the Virginia-class, a fast attack submarine designed for a broad range of missions, has been delayed a staggering 36 months from its original expected timeline, hampering efforts to bolster the U.S. submarine force. Additionally, the Navy’s next aircraft carrier, the Enterprise, is expected to be 18 to 26 months late barring any further complications. These significant delays put the U.S. Navy at a concerning disadvantage on the open seas.
In the past five years, China has overtaken the U.S. in total number of active warships. Although many experts consider U.S. ships to be more advanced and technically sound than their Chinese counterparts, ships that have been designed for fast production, China’s current rate of construction will create a large capability gap in the coming years. A larger number of warships makes it easier to replace losses in a prolonged conflict, no matter how technologically superior your opponent is. If a conflict between the U.S. and China were to break out, China would have a much easier time ramping up production further due to its experience creating shipyards that can pump out large numbers of vessels at a time. There are several reasons for these delays and subsequent cost overruns in the U.S. First, American shipyards are aging compared to those in China, Japan, or Korea, with the Secretary of the Navy remarking that they are “decades behind the global technological standard.” Most do not utilize the most modern digitization equipment, equipment which enables a shipyard to build ships much more efficiently while also tracking the progress much closer, allowing them to predict the exact completion date. Construction or expansion of new shipyards stagnated decades ago in the U.S., meaning outdated designs are still commonplace. Another significant cause of delays is workforce shortages in the shipyards and inexperience among those working in the industry. Covid-19 exacerbated existing shortages and accelerated the retirement of longtime employees, taking their valuable experience with them. Although the shortages reflect a nationwide trend, shipbuilding often carries a stigma and especially high turnover rates given the sometimes-difficult conditions. The U.S. Navy has attempted to combat this by providing monetary bonuses and creating better residential communities for blue-collar workers and their families. Finally, part of the problem lies directly with the Navy for often changing requirements or designs once the ship is already in production, leading to significant cost increases.
China’s current rate of construction will create a large capability gap in the coming years.
The U.S. should not incur unsustainable costs trying to match the Chinese Navy in the number of total ships, but drastic reform is still needed to bring the U.S. to a more favorable position. One possible change is to make more government contracts for ships fixed-price contracts which ensure that the government is not on the hook if costs are greater than expected. This incentivizes builders to find ways to keep costs low and bid accurately on contracts because they know any overrun will eat into their profits. This type of contract is used almost exclusively in our ally South Korea, which has shown they can produce similar ships to the U.S. at significantly reduced costs. However, for this to work, the U.S. Navy must reform its design process to ensure they will not have to step in mid-construction to modify requirements. Cost analysis of specifications should be rigorously analyzed and examined to ensure they match the current strategic objective of the U.S. military and are reasonably priced given the capabilities they provide. Although this is a lofty task, if done correctly, it would free up Navy money to invest in shipyards and begin a long-term process of modernizing them to boost efficiency during construction. This way, the U.S. would be set up for long-term success and have the capability to rival China in the contested South China Sea and beyond. It is time for a heavy re-evaluation of the U.S. Navy’s ship procurement process before it becomes too late to catch up and more tax dollars are wasted. Without immediate change, the gap in naval production will only continue to grow, leaving the U.S. at a distinct disadvantage.
Weldon Smith ‘27 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at s.weldon@wustl.edu.