With China on the rise and Russia on the march, prioritizing defense is more essential now than it’s been in decades. Trump says he believes in “peace through strength,” adopting Reagan’s slogan. On the surface, this should be a solid strategy — preparing for war deters our enemies from starting them, and helps us win wars that can’t be prevented. The question is whether the administration will be able to recreate the approach that worked for the first Cold War. In particular, let’s unpack whether our security relies on the international alliances that Trump is degrading, and whether our defense industry is capable of surging like it did in the 80s.
The West is split on its priorities. The U.S. and our allies in the Pacific need to ramp up our naval power to contain China, while Europe needs to bolster its ground forces to contain Russia. Both efforts are falling short, but for different reasons. After letting workforces shrink, shipyards close, and machinery become obsolete, the U.S. is unable to expand its fleet by throwing money at it. Meanwhile, after decades of well-funded social services and relying on American strength, Europe is reluctant to spend more on defense, and is left scrambling by the sudden rift with the U.S. Ironically, as international cohesion craters, the solution to all parties’ problems is partnership.
The U.S. is facing the consequences of prolonged neglect of the shipbuilding industry, which is proving indispensable for addressing our most powerful threat — China. Rectifying the mistakes that set us so far behind China would not only require insurmountable legislative action and funding, but also time. Developing the workforce we need, one with the necessary skills and institutional knowledge, will take more than a full presidential term. Overhauling our shipyards overnight is impossible, even if our lawmakers do everything right; but the same is not true for another way to solve this problem: embracing the workforces of our allies.
Ironically, as international cohesion craters, the solution to all parties’ problems is partnership.
Five years ago, we announced that we would build Constellation-class frigates, which were designed by France and Italy. Our construction is three years behind schedule, 40% over budget, and yet to complete a single warship. By contrast, French and Italian shipyards have made these same frigates for over a decade. Instead of throwing good money after bad, we should cut our losses by reassigning this work to those who have proven they can handle it. This goes beyond turning to Europe for frigates — following the same principle, we should also task our allies in Asia with building destroyers. While our Arleigh Burke-class destroyer production has deteriorated, South Korea and Japan have had no trouble making derivatives of the same ship.
By utilizing overseas capacity, the U.S. can free up manpower and infrastructure that would otherwise be wasted on failed manufacturing efforts. Instead of stretching ourselves thin on projects that others can build for us, every now-available shipyard can concentrate on more vital equipment that can’t be outsourced, such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. They can also put more emphasis on work that demands less expertise and institutional support, like maintenance for our already-existing fleet and making sea-drones, which are easier to produce than warships.
An arrangement like this would have mutual security benefits. In both quantity and speed, output for naval firepower would surpass what the U.S. could achieve alone. In exchange, Europe would receive much-needed capital for countering Russia. Europe’s need for cash is more pronounced under Trump than the previous administration, as he’s comparatively uninterested in controlling Moscow. Without American arms to prevent Ukraine’s front line from collapsing, the Europeans’ only choice is to donate their own equipment. In turn, Europe needs to buy replacements for this weaponry, which the profits from shipbuilding can partially fund.
When calls to increase defense spending come from the world’s largest arms exporter, it’s understandable why other nations question whose interests this would advance. Today, nearly every Western country agrees on the need to invest more in security, but this is made less appealing by the perception that doing so inherently benefits the U.S. While nobody wants to reward leadership they disapprove of, European rearmament does not need to funnel money to the U.S., as American military equipment isn’t the only option on the market, nor is it always the most effective.
Alliances and arms sales are force-multiplying assets that can improve security for both the U.S. and Europe, even when our interests diverge.
Some of our vehicles are outperformed by those from other countries, like Sweden’s Visby-class corvette and South Korea’s K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzer. The same applies to munitions, like Europe’s Meteor air-to-air missile and Israel’s Spice kit for guided bombs, along with portable weapons like Singapore’s STK-50 heavy machine gun and the UK’s Starstreak air-defense system. Compromising quality isn’t required to decouple from the U.S. arms industry, and we still benefit from Europe buying equipment elsewhere, as this lets us shift focus from Russia to China.Similar to how the U.S. can save money by leaning on our allies for frigates and destroyers, Europe can lower costs if individual nations stop obsessing over domestic production. NATO is notorious for redundant and incompatible equipment. This makes collaboration less efficient than it should be, an issue highlighted by the Ukrainian war effort — according to The New York Times, Ukraine “has been sent at least 17 different kinds of howitzers, not all of which use the same type of shell.” This drives up costs for virtually every category of system, from service rifles to fighter jets. With each additional design, crews need training on operation and maintenance, and another supply of spare parts. The consequences can be dramatic. This is part of why Ukraine, which only had Soviet aircraft when the war started, couldn’t fly Western jets until a year after the provision of F-16s was approved.
Instead of buying exact copies of its current arsenals, Europe should streamline its logistics. Ukraine is happy to absorb the assortment of legacy equipment, so the West should unload less desirable systems (i.e., the British Challenger 2 and Italian Ariete tanks) in Ukraine, then standardize on their replacements. The takeaway is that when nations trust their allies, they can not only save money by arming themselves more efficiently, but they can also end up with equipment that’s better designed. Strong alliances benefit everyone.
So far, I’ve covered why alliances and arms sales are force-multiplying assets that can improve security for both the U.S. and Europe, even when our interests diverge. These proposals might sound pointless if you think they’re made impossible by Trump’s antagonization of our allies, but because they would be mutually beneficial, these deals might actually be key to rebuilding those ties. However, regardless of whether we work with our allies as we should, we’ll still have to carry a significant share of the burden ourselves through manufacturing at home. This reality necessitates internal changes to make defense spending more efficient.
Similar to the missing workforce and infrastructure needed for shipbuilding, our entire defense industry is held back by systemic problems that cannot be overcome by merely spending more (even though defense spending should rise). Military equipment has grown unworkably expensive over the past 30 years because it’s unaffected by two factors that normally control prices in free markets: competition and consumer budgets. The absence of competition followed the end of the Cold War, when the Pentagon anticipated a drop in spending that would put companies out of business, and subsequently encouraged them to consolidate. This left only five major defense contractors, whose competition to undercut each other was broadly eliminated. As a consequence, prices are only restrained by limits to what the buyer can pay. This downward pressure is virtually nonexistent, as taxes give the government an immeasurable stream of money.
Our entire defense industry is held back by systemic problems that cannot be overcome by merely spending more.
These conditions raise several questions. How badly are we overcharged, and how can we fix this? Alarmingly, we don’t know exactly how much money is wasted because the Department of Defense is the only major federal agency to never pass an audit. Put differently, there aren’t even complete records of where the military’s budget is spent. The DoD’s first full audit was attempted in 2018. It failed, as did every following audit. While we can’t get proper data without audits, we have no shortage of outrageous anecdotes: the government has bought trash cans for $52,000 and $40 bags of steel bushings for $90,000. Last fall, Boeing overcharged the Pentagon by 8000% for soap dispensers. In a completely literal sense, we cannot afford to address the threat that China poses if the defense industry remains as wasteful with our money as it is today. Ensuring somewhat reasonable prices will require extensive reforms, but the first step is transparency. We need legislation demanding more information about how our taxes are spent.
I’m by no means rooting against defense contractors. Their success is crucial for making the U.S. and its allies powerful enough to deter — and if necessary, defeat — our adversaries. However, by diluting our purchasing power, these firms are jeopardizing national security. The issue with the so-called “military-industrial complex” isn’t its supposed influence on our politicians, but rather the overcharging that derails our hopes of keeping up with Beijing. For example, the U.S. pays over $3 million for each LRASM cruise missile, and is only expected to have 629 by 2027; in RAND’s wargames, 600 LRASMs “are assumed to be expended within the first 15 days of conflict.”
When Reagan pursued “peace through strength,” expanding our military was as straightforward as pumping money into the Pentagon. If Trump wants the same result in today’s Cold War against China, he needs to fix the defense industry and cooperate with our international allies.
Alex Lee ‘25 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at alex.b.lee@wustl.edu.