As the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches, a conflict that has turned into a grueling war with tens of thousands of deaths, Russia’s successful invasion of Crimea in 2014 must be reevaluated. I will examine how the operation, which faced little resistance from the Ukrainian military, was ultimately a mistake by Putin when considered in the context of his long-term goal of direct or indirect control over the entirety of Ukraine.
Although it is impossible to know the specific motivating factors and thought process behind the decision to invade in 2014, there were many different geopolitical and local forces that made it an attractive option. The Kremlin has long considered Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence, integral for promoting the idea that Russia should be the dominant player in European affairs. A “loss” of Ukraine to the West would demonstrate an inability to control even their “near abroad,” further raising doubts about Russia’s status as a superpower that deserves to be respected as equal to the U.S. and China on the international stage. Direct Western influence in Ukraine would also be extremely uncomfortable from a military standpoint. The idea of having N.A.T.O., Russia’s self-declared biggest adversary, directly on the Russian border, the same low-lands where decades earlier both Napoleon and Hitler had launched their invasions into the heart of Russia, created acute fear and was considered untenable by Russian military and political leadership.
Additionally, the Ukrainian government estimates that 5% of the world’s “critical raw materials” lie within its borders, including large lithium, rare earth metals, coal and titanium deposits. Ukraine is also home to 25% of the world’s “black soil,” some of the richest soil on the planet, which makes it a huge grain producer and exporter. Russia risked losing privileged access to these resources because of the pro-Western sentiment rising during Euromaidan.
Strategic thinking also played a role in the Kremlin’s 2014 decision-making. The Russian port at Sevastopol, leased from the Ukrainians, is the headquarters of their Black Sea fleet and a crucial warm-water port for exporting abroad. If Russia were to lose the port, they would lose dominance over the Black Sea, and an important shipping route would be left vulnerable. With a Ukrainian pivot towards the West likely after Euromaidan, Putin feared that N.A.T.O. would pressure the country into canceling the lease early for sovereignty and geostrategic reasons. Between ongoing geopolitical concerns, strategic thinking and the likely lack of strong resistance, it is easy to understand why Putin made the decision to annex the peninsula in 2014.
Ultimately, Putin’s Crimea invasion went seamlessly for him, with Russian special forces capturing the Crimean parliament, ousting the current government and holding a sham referendum that the Russians claimed chose independence and allegiance to Russia. Internationally, sanctions were placed on Russian companies and individuals by the E.U. and the U.S., but they were piecemeal and had little to no long term effect on Russia’s overall economy, which continued its significant trade with the E.U. on most products. These outcomes were as good as Putin could hope for and arguably opened the door for the full-scale version of the attack in 2022.
Putin failed to see the long-term strategic picture in Ukraine, or at least made poor judgments about it.
However, Putin failed to see the long-term strategic picture in Ukraine, or at least made poor judgments about it. There were a number of situational aspects that could have changed his thinking, leading him to decide not to annex Crimea when he did. First, time was on Putin’s side if he chose to use it. Despite Ukrainians’ clear desire to be integrated into the E.U. or N.A.T.O., neither was very likely to happen in the short term. The E.U. was going through a period of enlargement fatigue in the early 2010s, and the furthest steps taken towards ascension were a European Parliament resolution noting that Ukraine “can” become a member of the E.U. and the association agreement that Euromaidan protestors fought for. Formal negotiations between N.A.T.O. and Ukraine had also not begun in any sense.
Concern that Russia would be powerless to stop Ukraine from canceling the lease of Sevastopol is irrelevant because the option to conduct a partial invasion of Crimea would remain open for Putin if he did not take action in 2014. If Ukraine canceled the lease, Russia’s 20,000 troops in Sevastopol would be able to hold the port until forces from Russia arrived to annex the peninsula, and the international reaction would likely be friendlier to Russia due to Ukraine’s breach of contract. If Ukraine were to get tangibly closer to joining N.A.T.O. or the E.U., Putin could choose to invade Crimea then too, creating enough uncertainty in the country to make both institutions hesitate on allowing Ukraine in while Russian troops strengthen.
Other consequences would admittedly have been more difficult to predict, but still could have been recognized as within the realm of possibility in the aftermath of a 2014 invasion of Crimea. It would have been reasonable for Russia to expect that the Ukrainian military would make improvements following a successful Russian operation. Russia could expect that a partial invasion would clear out pro-Russian elements and commanders of the Ukrainian military, to Ukraine’s long-term benefit. Between 2015 and 2022, Ukraine structurally reorganized its military to ensure full civilian control, a more clear command structure and a focus on interoperability with N.A.T.O. and E.U. forces through modernization efforts. Ukraine’s defense spending rose by nearly a full percent of GDP, and the United States, despite taking a weak stance on sanctions, gave hundreds of millions of dollars in military and humanitarian aid to the Ukrainian government. Simultaneously, the psychology of nationalism makes clear that Russian offensive action was likely going to add vast amounts of fuel to the flames of Ukrainian nationalism, to the detriment of any support for Russian narratives. The stronger nationalism and the will to fight became in Ukraine, the harder it was going to be to occupy or control Ukraine long-term, even if Putin predicted an easy power grab down the line.
By not invading in 2014, Putin would leave himself with greater flexibility for future options regarding Ukraine.
The decision to invade moves from unnecessary to detrimental for Russia when the following is considered. By not invading in 2014, Putin would leave himself with greater flexibility for future options regarding Ukraine. He could have played the long game with the country, waiting for an economic crisis, corruption scandal in the pro-Europe party, or a new reactionary movement to emerge to once again promote a pro-Russian candidate and eventually take control of parliament, the presidency, or both. Russia is skilled at misinformation campaigns, election interference and general psychological operations, making it a viable option long-term despite the result of Euromaidan, particularly with the high likelihood of the West dragging its feet in the process of Ukrainian N.A.T.O. and E.U. accession.
If, after a number of years, it became clear that the non-military option was not going to be viable, the option to invade would remain on the table. Before the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s military was growing stronger as Ukraine’s stagnated, and without the 2014 invasion, it likely would have continued this way until Putin felt that his armies were strong enough to take the entirety of Ukraine, securing his vital interests at Sevastopol and pulling Ukraine away from the West in one action. He jeopardized this calculation with military action in 2014, kickstarting changes within Ukraine that ultimately made his 2022 invasion much more costly than it needed to be. Part of the cost can be attributed to Western financial, military and political support for the Ukrainian cause. A Russian full-scale invasion was bound to elicit a fierce response no matter what, but if Putin was able to capture all of Ukraine in days or weeks, as he predicted in 2022 (and likely would have been correct about if not for the post-2014 reforms and aid), the West would not have enough time to react to protect Ukraine and prolong the conflict. Unfortunately for Russia, none of this thinking was relevant after the decision to take Crimea in an opportunistic play in early 2014.
Not only was the invasion ultimately detrimental for Russia, but the knowledge available at the time also made it possible for Putin to reach this conclusion.
With his military rebuilt and the recent election of pro-Europe candidate Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the Ukrainian presidency, Vladimir Putin decided that a full-scale invasion of Ukraine was necessary in 2022. Putin’s initial goal of toppling Ukraine within three days was unattainable in the face of Ukrainian resistance, something that can be tied directly back to his invasion to annex Crimea eight years earlier. The 2014 invasion has primarily been viewed as a resounding success for fulfilling Russia’s geopolitical and strategic ambitions, but these analyses do not take a long term look at the effects that it had on decisions made in the years following. Not only was the invasion ultimately detrimental for Russia, but the knowledge available at the time also made it possible for Putin to reach this conclusion. It has taken only 11 years for the invasion of Crimea to establish itself as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, as a mistake disguised as a win, leaving Putin in a much worse position than he had to be in to reach his geopolitical goals.
Weldon Smith ‘27 studies in the College of Arts & Sciences. He can be reached at s.weldon@wustl.edu.